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Lecture 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S ACCOMMODATION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THEORY 
MARK TUSHNET† 
ABSTRACT 
   In the first decades of the twentieth century, Progressive politicians 
and legal theorists advocated the creation and then the expansion of 
administrative agencies. These agencies, they argued, could address 
rapidly changing social circumstances more expeditiously than could 
courts and legislatures, and could deploy scientific expertise, rather 
than mere political preference, in solving the problems social change 
produced. The proliferation of administrative agencies in the New 
Deal—the SEC, the NLRB, and others—meant that defending 
administrative agencies from close judicial oversight became 
intertwined with defending the New Deal itself. In a series of 
contentious cases decided by the Hughes Court, Progressives believed 
that they had suffered loss after loss. And, counting only outcomes, 
they had. Yet by the end of the decade, the Court had moved 
administrative law closer to the position the Progressives had sought. 
This Lecture examines developments in administrative law in the 
1930s. Focusing on three major cases during that decade, this Lecture 
describes how far administrative law adapted to the vision articulated 
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by Progressive scholars, most notably Felix Frankfurter and James 
Landis. In each case, Progressives believed that the Court had 
substantially eroded the accomplishments of administrative law; but 
in each, Progressives were mistaken. And whereas the Progressives 
failed to acknowledge how much they had gained from the Supreme 
Court during the 1930s, by the end of that decade, their opponents 
better understood what had occurred and mobilized political support 
to retrench. Only a presidential veto stood in the way of a substantial 
revision of administrative law. That veto, though, allowed modern 
administrative law to adapt to the changing place of administrative 
agencies in the modern administrative state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1900 and 1930, Progressive politicians and legal 
theorists advocated the adoption and then the expansion of 
administrative agencies. These agencies could address rapidly 
changing social circumstances more expeditiously than could courts 
and legislatures, and could deploy scientific expertise, rather than TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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mere political preference, in solving the problems produced by social 
change. The Supreme Court initially was skeptical about the 
proposition that the new administrative state could fit easily into the 
American constitutional order. But by the time Charles Evans 
Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930, the Court had accommodated 
the administrative state, in part because the advocates for 
administrative agencies tempered their claims out of the prudential 
concern that seeking too much would lead the Court to reject the 
administrative state entirely. 
Yet Progressive legal theorists never fully abandoned their 
defense of what Roscoe Pound pejoratively called “administrative 
absolutism,” and the economic crisis that began in 1929 gave them the 
opportunity to press aggressively forward. The proliferation of 
administrative agencies in the New Deal—the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), and more—meant that defending administrative agencies 
from close judicial oversight became intertwined with defending the 
New Deal itself.
1 In a series of contentious cases decided by the 
Hughes Court, Progressives believed that they had suffered loss after 
loss.
2 And, counting only outcomes, they had. Yet by the end of the 
decade, the Court had moved administrative law closer to the 
position the Progressives had sought.
3 Ironically, by the time the 
Court had accommodated the Progressive theory of administrative 
law, the way agencies functioned in the political system was beginning 
to change. Interest-group bargaining—a form of politics—was 
relocated into administrative agencies, and the Progressive claim that 
administrative agencies pursued science rather than politics became 
difficult to sustain. The Progressive vision remained dominant, 
though, and its association with the New Deal produced a political 
reaction that resulted in the enactment of the Administrative 
Procedure Act in 1946. 
This Lecture, part of a larger work in progress on the Supreme 
Court under Charles Evans Hughes, examines developments in 
administrative law in the 1930s. Part I lays out administrative law 
theory as articulated by Progressive scholars, most notably Felix 
Frankfurter and James Landis, and sketches some of the changes that 
scholars identified by the end of the decade. Part II turns to the 
 
 1.  See infra Part II.A. 
 2.  See infra Part II.B–D. 
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Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1930s. After describing how far 
administrative law had adapted to the Progressive vision by 1930 and 
how it had changed by 1940, Part II examines three major cases in 
some detail. The discussions show how, in each case, Progressives 
believed that the Court had substantially eroded the accomplishments 
of administrative law, and how, in each, Progressives were mistaken. 
Part III describes the political reaction to developments in 
administrative law and practice, arguing that while the Progressives 
failed to acknowledge how much they had gained from the Supreme 
Court, their opponents mobilized political support to retrench. Only a 
presidential veto stood in the way of a substantial revision of 
administrative law. That veto, though, allowed modern administrative 
law to adapt to the changing place of agencies in the modern 
administrative state. The Lecture concludes with a brief observation 
about the shift from the Constitution to statutes as the means by 
which the administrative state would be controlled after 1940. 
I.  PROGRESSIVES AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE SCHOLARLY 
VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
Progressive legal theorists defended the rise of the administrative 
state. For them, the rapidity of social and economic change rendered 
the traditional tripartite scheme of government outmoded: neither 
legislatures nor courts could respond quickly enough, or with enough 
expertise, to the problems generated by change. Progressives 
presented a vision of the administrative state less through a series of 
propositions than through an account of its inevitability and therefore 
its constitutionality. Their examination of the administrative state in 
operation led them to conclude that administrative agencies ought to 
be freed from close judicial supervision, at least if the agencies were 
reformed to fit the Progressives’ model. 
A.  Felix Frankfurter and James Landis on Administrative Law 
In 1930, Felix Frankfurter delivered the Dodge Lectures at Yale 
University. The lecture series was devoted to the “responsibilities of 
citizenship,” and previous lecturers included distinguished public 
servants, such as then-Judge William Howard Taft in 1906 and 
Charles Evans Hughes in 1910. Frankfurter decided to speak on “The 
Public and Its Government,” providing a summary of Progressive 
ideas about modern government and, in particular, on the necessity of TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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administrative rather than legislative regulation of the modern state.
4 
Eight years later, James Landis, a Harvard Law professor turned New 
Dealer turned dean at Harvard,
5 gave the Storrs Lectures on “The 
Administrative Process,” also at Yale.
6 The two sets of lectures 
provide bookends to the story told by Progressives of administrative 
law through the 1930s. 
Frankfurter and Landis sounded some of the same themes early 
and late. The New Deal experience produced some modest revisions 
of those themes, hinting at the larger rethinking that was to come 
after 1941. 
Frankfurter and Landis emphasized the rapidity of social and 
economic change. Frankfurter began with a description of the “new 
material forces” provoking “swiftly moving changes” in American 
society in the late nineteenth century and afterwards—population 
growth, urbanization, and the extension of the nation’s railroad 
network.
7 Like Frankfurter’s, Landis’s story began early in the 
nineteenth century, when “the functions of government were limited 
essentially to the prevention of disorder, protection from foreign 
invasion, the enlargement of national boundaries, the stimulation of 
international trade, and the creation of a scheme of officials to settle 
civil disputes.”
8 
Next, they emphasized the inability of legislatures, political 
parties, and courts to respond adequately and promptly to that 
change. As Frankfurter put it, before 1887, state laws “dealt with 
simple situations in a simple way, most frequently forbidding 
whatever mischief revealed itself as needing more than individual 
corrective.”
9 Frankfurter criticized the Court for limiting the ability of 
 
 4.  FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930). 
 5.  See DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 29–42, 79 
(1980). 
 6.  JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 7.  FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 7–10. He also wrote, “Following the Civil War there 
was an almost magical industrial growth,” and “[v]ast physical forces have produced great social 
changes.” Id. at 23. Measuring social change by the number of patents issued and laws enacted, 
Frankfurter observed that the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 
“dates the break with the simplicities of the past” and “begins the new era of governmental 
regulation and administrative control.” Id. at 25. 
 8.  LANDIS, supra note 6, at 6. He continued by observing that industrialism and “the rise 
of democracy” caused “social maladjustments,” which required rectification. Id. at 7–8. 
 9.  FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 14–15. Frankfurter understood that party government 
meant patronage government, which he contrasted with the Progressive ideal of government by 
experts: “[t]he interplay between government and the complicated structure of industrial society TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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states to innovate. “The states need the amplest scope for energy and 
individuality in dealing with the myriad problems created by our 
complex industrial civilization. They need wide latitude in devising 
ways and means for paying the bills of society and in using taxation as 
an instrument of social policy.”
10 Elaborating on the difficulties 
presented to traditional institutions, Landis described legislative 
efforts to regulate directly by enacting statutes addressing specific 
problems.
11 These statutes, though, were “crude and useless,” and 
were always too late, addressing problems that had often faded into 
insignificance by the time legislatures acted.
12 Common law remedies 
administered in the courts were not much better, by Landis’s account. 
Depending on the initiative of aggrieved parties or public 
prosecutors, these remedies “were more apparent than real because 
of the costly and uncertain character of the legal actions that had to 
 
demands as never before men of independence and disinterestedness in public life.” Id. at 34–
35. 
 10.  Id. at 48. For Frankfurter, against the “drastic transformation” in the late nineteenth 
century, “members of the Supreme Court continued to reflect the social and economic order in 
which they grew up.” Id. at 44–45. Because “[t]hey sought to stereotype ephemeral facts into 
legal absolutes,” they wrote “abstract conceptions concerning ‘liberty of contract’ . . . into 
constitutional dogmas.” Id. at 45. Although the Court’s “hostility to legislation reached its crest” 
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and then receded, “those who had hoped that this 
deeper insight . . . into the realities of modern society would endure, were to be disappointed.” 
FRANKFURTER,  supra note 4, at 46. Frankfurter observed that the Court since 1920 had 
“invalidated more such legislation than in the fifty years preceding,” and “always by a divided 
Court, always over the protest of its most distinguished minds!” Id. at 47. 
    Frankfurter’s critique of the Supreme Court was comprehensive: the Court’s decisions 
on federalism, substantive limitations on government power, and separation of powers all failed 
in devising constitutional rules allowing government to respond to “[o]ur rapid 
industrialization” and “[t]he pressure of practical necessities.” Id. at 66. To Frankfurter, 
“Government means experimentation,” and “[o]pportunity must be allowed for vindicating 
reasonable belief by experience.” Id. at 49. The Supreme Court’s “veto power . . . over the 
social-economic legislation of the states . . . is the most vulnerable aspect of undue 
centralization.” Id. at 50. It was  
at once the most destructive and the least responsible: the most destructive, because 
judicial nullification . . . stops experimentation at its source, and bars increase to the 
fund of social knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error; the least responsible, 
because it so often turns on the fortuitous circumstances which determine a majority 
decision and shelters the fallible judgment of individual Justices, in matters of fact 
and opinion not peculiarly within the special competence of judges, behind the 
impersonal dooms of the Constitution. 
Id. at 50–51. A single Justice’s “tip of . . . mind or . . . fears[] may determine the opportunity of a 
much needed social experiment to survive, or may frustrate for a long time intelligent attempts 
to deal with a social evil.” Id. at 51. 
 11.  See  LANDIS,  supra  note 6, at 9 (noting the failure of early legislative attempts to 
regulate railroad charges and tariffs). 
 12.  Id. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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be pursued.”
13 Courts’ sporadic interventions left them unable “to 
maintain a long-time, uninterrupted interest in a relatively narrow 
and carefully defined area of economic and social activity.”
14 The 
adjustments that were needed, Landis wrote, “could not be achieved 
through the intermittent intervention of the judicial process.”
15 For 
Landis, “The administrative process [was], in essence, [his] 
generation’s answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the 
legislative processes.”
16 
They insisted that experts should lead in making policy through 
modern administrative agencies. The solution to the problems of 
responding to rapid change was “a permanent, professional 
administrative agency” that could deal with “the demands of law 
upon economic enterprise” through “the continuity of study, the slow 
building up of knowledge, the stimulation of experiments”—“new 
political inventions responsive to the pressure of new economic and 
social facts.”
17 As Landis put it, administrative agencies could provide 
“continuing concern with and control over the economic forces which 
affect the life of the community.”
18 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 30. 
 15.  Id. at 9. 
 16.  Id.  at 46. As another student of administrative law put it, “the inadequacy of the 
common-law processes and . . . the shortcomings of direct statutory regulation” produced the 
modern administrative agency. 1 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: 
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 287 (1931). 
 17.  FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 72–73, 88. Railroad and utility regulation provided 
Frankfurter’s examples. See  id. at 83–88 (outlining how States followed Congress’s 
establishment of the ICC by establishing independent administrative bodies to overcome “[t]he 
incapacity of the existing system of regulation to cope with revealed abuses and the emergence 
of new forms of public services”). Public-utility regulation was “perhaps the most significant 
political tendency at the turn of the century,” because it responded to “the political influences 
[the utilities] exerted, the technological advances,” and, perhaps most important, “the 
feebleness of existing machinery and procedure for control.” Id. at 83. States and then the 
national government developed new “instruments and processes through which sound relations 
between public utilities and the public could work themselves out.” Id. at 86. They created 
“nonpolitical administrative agenc[ies] . . . , presumably expert and disinterested and equipped 
with the necessary technical aid, charged with securing to the public at reasonable cost services 
adequate according to modern technological standards and assuring to the utilities a fair income 
to make possible these services.” Id. at 86–87. When the regulated industries raised 
constitutional challenges, “[h]appily, statesmanship triumphed,” with state courts and the 
Supreme Court finding constitutional doctrine “adaptable to the new exigencies of government” 
and rejecting the argument that these new “devices” were unconstitutional “merely because 
[they] exercised functions which, as a matter of logical analysis, partook of all three forms of 
governmental power.” Id. at 87–88. 
 18.  LANDIS, supra note 6, at 8. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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[E]xpertness . . . . springs only from that continuity of interest, that 
ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to 
a particular problem. . . . [T]he art of regulating an industry requires 
knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift 
requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate, the 
pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency, 
and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to 
policy.
19 
They rejected close judicial oversight of agency decisions.
20 For 
example, the Court had required that rates provide a fair return on 
investment, which Frankfurter thought rested on “essentially 
economic” premises, but “no judicial pronouncements upon matters 
fundamentally economic run so counter to the views of economists as 
do the more recent utterances of the Supreme Court,” which were 
“based upon unrealities, [were] financially unsound, and [led] to 
uncertainty and speculation.”
21 
They understood that existing agencies did not conform to their 
ideal, but both sought internal reform of administrative agencies 
rather than substantial external supervision, especially supervision by 
 
 19.  Id. at 23–24; see also id. at 152 (“Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is 
related to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such questions.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
  20.  “[T]he tendency over the past few decades has been to decrease rather than to increase 
the power of judges to impose checks upon the exercise of administrative power.” Id. at 100; see 
also id. at 142 (“[T]he expertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate procedures, can 
be trusted . . . .”). 
    To Frankfurter, the Court’s doctrines on separation of powers were somewhat less 
vulnerable to criticism than its due process holdings. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 77. 
The “shrewd men of the world who framed the Constitution” knew that doctrine had to give 
political actors “latitude . . . in a work-a-day world,” and, “barring some recent decisions,” the 
Court had agreed, refusing “to draw abstract analytical lines of separation” and recognizing 
“necessary areas of interaction among the departments of government.” Id. at 77–78. This 
allowed Congress “to move with freedom in modern fields of legislation, with their great 
complexity and shifting facts, calling for technical knowledge and skill in administration.” Id. at 
78. He concluded his second 1930 lecture with the observation that “[e]nforcement of a rigid 
conception of separation of powers would make modern government impossible.” Id.  But, 
Frankfurter continued, “pessimism has supplanted the earlier feeling of hope.” Id. at 92. The 
catalogue of difficulties was long, including the “failure . . . to reflect decreased operating 
costs[,] .  .  . the costly futility of rate proceedings[,] . . . [and the] failure to exercise skilled 
initiative in the promotion of the public interest”—all leading to an increase of “the impotence 
of the individual” and the diminution of “the mastery of law over these enterprises.” Id. at 93. 
Nonetheless, “the current judicial approach” was at “[t]he heart of the difficulty.” Id. at 101. 
 21.  Id. at 101–03. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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the courts.
22 For Frankfurter, the agencies themselves were unable to 
cope with the tasks they had been given.
23 Part of the difficulty lay 
with legislatures, which had not given the agencies the support they 
needed: “[t]he men intrusted with the task ha[d] almost everywhere 
been overburdened by details, inadequately staffed, denied necessary 
technical aid, subjected to short tenures, dependent on meager 
salaries, and generally restricted to appropriations which produce 
humdrum routine.”
24 With a Progressive’s confidence that merely 
exposing difficulties in government would lead to reform, Frankfurter 
called not for a re-imagining of how administrative agencies could 
operate in the “work-a-day” world,
25 but for reinvigorating the 
Progressive ideal: 
The complex problems of regulation call for a governmental agency 
qualified by experience, fortified by technical assistance, free from 
the pulls and pressures of politics, generating an esteem in the public 
such as the public now entertains for the judiciary, a public esteem 
which in its turn will arouse in these officials enterprise, courage, 
and devotion to the public good.
26 
 
  22.  Legislatures had allowed “too many mediocre lawyers” to be “appointed for political 
considerations,” and had treated agencies “not as means for solving difficult problems of 
government, but as opportunities for political advancement or more profitable future 
association” with the regulated industries. Id. at 114. Though “utility regulation at its best 
call[ed] for fresh energy and newer resources to cope with the new and greater tasks that now 
confront it,” there was “inequality in expertise, in will, in energy, in imagination, between the 
utilities and government.” Id. at 112–13. Looking at agency personnel, Frankfurter observed 
that “[e]xcept for occasional men of great capacity and exceptional devotion to the public 
interest, the technical staffs of the commissions, their engineers and accountants, [were] . . . no 
match for the experts against whom they [were] pitted.” Id. at 115. Taking the relatively new 
Federal Power Commission as his example, Frankfurter argued that “a few subordinates, 
subjected to great temptations and with appropriations from Congress so meager as to starve 
their efforts, [were] hardly equipped to meet complacency and legalism within the Commission 
and the pressure of acute and powerful forces without.” Id. at 119–20. Frankfurter noted that 
“one of the patent facts about our system” was “[t]hat the level of professionalism, of trained 
capacity, in our administration of criminal justice is very low.” Id. at 154–55. 
 23.  Id. at 112–13. 
 24.  Id. at 113. 
 25.  Id. at 77. 
 26.  Id. at 122. One of Frankfurter’s students had expressed his own skepticism about 
staffing administrative agencies: 
In the long run, and until current ideals of public service change very radically, it 
cannot be expected that a government commission, paying modest salaries and 
exposed to the vicissitudes of political life, can command the services of those super-
men whose decisions are always made of the substance of justice and wisdom . . . . 
GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCEDURE  328  (1924).    James Landis noted that “trial examiners’ staffs on the TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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Perhaps most important, Frankfurter and Landis worried that 
expert administrative agencies—however effective they were as 
instruments of governance—might lack democratic legitimacy. Both 
men struggled to articulate accounts that explained why agencies 
were indeed properly democratic. Frankfurter’s fourth and final 
lecture sought to explain how the Progressive vision of modern 
government through expert agencies comported with democratic 
ideals. Glancing at Soviet Russia and fascist Italy, Frankfurter 
described democracy as relying on “more plodding popular 
institutions.”
27 But “democracy is the reign of reason on the most 
extensive scale. It seeks to prevail when the complexities of life make 
a demand upon knowledge and understanding never made 
before . . . .”
28 Resolving the deeper problems of American 
government required a new understanding of democracy. Because 
“the staples of contemporary politics  .  .  .  are deeply enmeshed in 
intricate and technical facts,” they “must be extricated from 
presupposition and partisanship.”
29 Instead, the nation needed 
“systematic effort to contract the area of conflict and passion and 
widen the area of accredited knowledge as the basis of action.”
30 
Frankfurter disclaimed the possibility that he was “suggesting 
that the conquest of science calls for a new type of oligarchy, namely, 
 
whole have too little competence” because of low salaries and “the rigid requirements of civil 
service rules.” LANDIS, supra note 6, at 104. 
 27.  FRANKFURTER,  supra note 4, at 123. Frankfurter praised the British system of a 
permanent and prestigious civil service for eliciting “talent . . . [in] public administration,” but 
noted that “it is wholly wrong to expect civilized standards of public service from officials whose 
salaries are too low to enable them to meet the minimum standards of cultivated life.” Id. at 136, 
139. Adapting that system to the United States would mean that “government [would] have at 
its disposal the resources of training and capacity equipped to understand and deal with the 
complicated issues to which these technological forces give rise.” Id. at 151. For Frankfurter, the 
American spoils system reflected “a crude logic of democracy and the versatile energy of the 
pioneer,” but was inadequate “in the modern world,” which required more than “the simple 
virtues of honesty and public devotion.” Id. at 147, 150. 
 28.  Id. at 127. 
 29.  Id. at 152. 
 30.  Id. As Frankfurter acknowledged, “[A]gitation and advocacy have their place.” Id. at 
153. They were  
instruments of education, means for making effective the findings of knowledge and 
the lessons of experience. But the quiet, detached, laborious task of disentangling 
facts from fiction, of extracting reliable information from interested parties, of 
agreeing on what is proof and what surmise, must precede, if agitation is to feed on 
knowledge and reality, and be equipped to reach the mind rather than to exploit 
feeling. 
Id. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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government by experts.”
31 For him, “power . . . must more and more 
be lodged in administrative experts,” and therefore had to be 
“properly circumscribed and zealously scrutinized.”
32 This could be 
done “through machinery and processes,” but, strikingly, these were 
not the traditional machinery and processes of law.
33 Nor were they 
the processes of politics: 
In a democracy, politics is a process of popular education—the task 
of adjusting the conflicting interests of diverse groups in the 
community, and bending the hostility and suspicion and ignorance 
engendered by group interests toward a comprehension of mutual 
understanding. For these ends, expertise is indispensable. But 
politicians must enlist popular support for the technical means by 
which alone social policies can be realized.
34 
Rather, the agencies’ democratic legitimacy “largely depend[ed] on 
very high standards of professional service, an effective 
procedure . . . , easy access to public scrutiny and a constant play of 
alert public criticism, especially by an informed and spirited bar.”
35 
These “instruments for governing”—“organization, technological 
skill, and scientific methods”—were the means by which the end, “the 
art of making men live together in peace and with reasonable 
happiness,” could be pursued.
36 
 
 31.  Id. at 157. 
 32.  Id. at 157–58 (emphasis added). 
 33.  Id. at 159–60. 
 34.  Id. at 161. 
 35.  Id. at 159. 
 36.  Id. at 160. “[I]mproving the personnel of administrative agencies” might be desirable, 
but until it was accomplished, agencies might lack sufficient democratic justification. Ralph F. 
Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538, 
567 (1938). Justice Brandeis had observed that “[r]esponsibility is the great developer of men. 
May it not tend to emasculate or demoralize the rate-making body if ultimate responsibility is 
transferred to others?” St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 92 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). For Robert Cooper, the very existence of judicial oversight created a 
“vicious circle” in which “the existence of mediocrity” was “caused, at least in part, by the 
existing tendency to subordinate administration to a place of inferiority within the framework of 
government.” Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47 YALE 
L.J. 577, 601 (1938). Why, he asked, would “men of ability and competence” want to work in 
“such positions of questionable responsibility”? Id. “[M]aking authority coextensive with 
responsibility” would, Cooper suggested, improve the quality of the personnel in place even 
without any additional actions by the legislature. Id. Only this would preserve “popular 
government” from degenerating into “a more efficient form of political authority,” one that 
might “sacrific[e] fundamental political ideals.” Id. at 601–02. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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Progressives grudgingly accommodated the courts in the early 
years of modern administrative law. The new administrative agencies 
faced courts suspicious of the substantive policies the agencies had 
been told to pursue and of the lawyers determined to retain lucrative 
business. The agencies responded by giving their procedures a judicial 
form—for example, holding hearings at which evidence was taken 
and placing limitations on the use of hearsay evidence.
37 But to 
Progressives, agency proceedings could not be fully “judicialized” 
without losing the advantages of expertise and relatively quick 
responses to new problems. The Progressives were willing to go part 
of the way toward procedures resembling those in judicial 
proceedings, but their concessions were never enthusiastic. They 
wanted to insulate the modern administrative state from judges 
supervising the agencies and imposing court-like procedures on them, 
and from lawyers who lacked the comprehensive overview of the 
economic or social problems within each agency’s jurisdiction.
38 
B.  I.L. Sharfman on Administrative Law in the Interstate Commerce 
Commission 
Frankfurter’s lectures described the ideal administrative state. 
He knew that the reality in the United States was far from ideal. 
Frankfurter’s studies of administrative law led him to support a 
research project by the Commonwealth Fund. The Fund 
commissioned a series of studies of administrative law—“the extent 
to which administrative control has, by modern regulation, been in 
fact conferred.”
39 
 
 37.  See LANDIS, supra note 6, at 141–42 (describing the “great emphasis” Justice Brandeis 
placed on the “quasi-judicial” nature of “administrative tribunals”). 
 38.  See supra notes 17–20. 
 39.  Foreword to 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at v. The Fund was founded in 1918 by Anna 
Harkness, the widow of one of the founders of Standard Oil Company. Commonwealth Fund 
Spent $2,095,911 in 1930, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1931, at 28. It generally focused on supporting 
public health, including grants to New York’s social work agencies. Id. During the 1920s, a small 
portion of its funds was devoted to legal research, supervised by a committee chaired by George 
Welwood Murray, a prominent New York lawyer and an active alumnus of Columbia Law 
School. 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at vi. Other committee members included three law school 
deans—Roscoe Pound of Harvard, Young Smith of Columbia, and Henry Bates of Michigan—
and the influential Wall Street lawyer Charles C. Burlingham. Id. For an examination of 
Frankfurter’s influence on the Commonwealth Fund’s conceptualization of administrative law, 
see generally Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A 
Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171 (2009). The Fund’s Legal 
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Gerard C. Henderson, a Frankfurter protégé, wrote the Fund’s 
first volume, on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
40 Less than a 
decade old when the book was published in 1924, the FTC had 
struggled to establish coherent antitrust policy. And Henderson’s 
book, largely a pedestrian catalogue of the FTC’s work whose 
recurrent theme was that the FTC’s decisions rarely explained its 
conclusions adequately, did little to support the Progressive vision of 
modern administrative law. 
Henderson offered the Progressive vision as part, but only part, 
of his story about the FTC’s creation. He described the arguments 
made by Progressive supporters of new legislation sympathetically,
41 
but, he observed, the Progressive impulse was only one of two strands 
of support for creating the FTC.
42 The other was supplied by 
“business men, trade associations, and commercial and industrial 
interests to whom the uncertainty of the law had become 
exasperating.”
43 The FTC’s work, Henderson suggested, was 
hampered by the conflict inherent in its creation.
44 In area after area, 
the Commission failed. Henderson thought an expert agency should 
be able to make factual findings about an industry that a court could 
not, but the FTC’s findings were of “meagre quality.”
45 The “net 
result” of the FTC’s cases dealing with contracts between 
manufacturers and dealers was “substantially nil,” with findings that 
 
The vast changes wrought in the social and economic aspects of society during the 
nineteenth century, due to the introduction of new mechanical forces, the penetrating 
influence of science, large scale industry and progressive urbanization have reflected 
themselves in a steady extension of legal control of social and economic interests. 
HENDERSON,  supra note 26, at v. At first, legislatures tried to intervene through statutes 
“depending . . . for enforcement upon the rigid, cumbersome and inevitably ineffective 
machinery of the criminal law.” Id. Administrative “instruments,” which “greatly widened the 
field of discretion,” were the new mode of regulation. Id. The Fund’s project involved 
examining “the actual workings of carefully selected administrative organs . . . [as] a 
prerequisite for an appraisal of what administrative law really does.” Id. at vi–vii. 
 40.  HENDERSON, supra note 26. 
 41.  Id. at 18–19 (“The forms of unfair and oppressive competition are myriad. By the time 
Congress has discovered and defined a dozen, a dozen more will be devised and put in 
operation. A tribunal should be created, with power to mold and adapt the law to each new 
situation. Since business and economic problems will be encountered, as well as questions of 
law, the power should be lodged with a commission composed of eminent lawyers, economists, 
business men, and publicists . . . .”). 
 42.  Id. at 17. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See id. at 83–87 (noting that the Commission neither maintained judicial independence 
nor provided promptness and speed). 
 45.  Id. at 116. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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“appear[ed] to be peculiarly barren of the fruits of economic research 
and understanding, and to an unusual degree the products of legalism 
and dogma.”
46 And, betraying a core premise of the Progressive case 
for administrative agencies, “the Federal Trade Commission [was] 
not primarily built for speed”
47 because of its judicialized 
procedures—themselves the product of the compromise between 
Progressives and commercial interests.
48 
Henderson offered a bleak picture of the administrative state in 
action. But it was not the only picture available to Progressives like 
Frankfurter. At the end of the 1930s, Frankfurter urged his Harvard 
colleagues to award that year’s James Barr Ames Prize for the best 
book on law to another product of the Commonwealth Fund project, 
lawyer-economist Isaiah Leo Sharfman’s comprehensive treatise on 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Calling it “a 
monumental work,” Frankfurter told his colleague Zechariah Chafee 
that Sharfman’s work offered a “perspective” on “the whole domain 
of what we call administrative law.”
49 
For Frankfurter, Sharfman’s work exemplified the Progressive 
understanding of administrative law after a half decade of New Deal 
experience. It offered a positive case for the administrative state to 
offset Henderson’s skepticism. Sharfman was a meticulous scholar
50 
who eventually wrote five volumes on the ICC. The first of these, 
published in 1931, reflected the Progressive vision in almost pristine 
form. By 1937, when the final volume appeared, Sharfman’s 
perspective had shifted subtly as New Deal experience accumulated. 
But even in the final volume, he defended the Progressive vision of 
administrative law in almost the same terms that Frankfurter had 
used in 1930. 
 
 46.  Id. at 316–17. 
 47.  Id. at 86. 
 48.  Id. at 17. 
  49.  Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Zechariah Chafee (Mar. 11, 1939) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library). 
  50.  Born in Russia in 1886, Sharfman graduated from Harvard College in 1907 and from 
the Law School in 1910. HARVARD COLLEGE CLASS OF 1907: SECRETARY’S REPORT NO. III, 
1907–1913, at 267 (1913). In 1912 the Chinese revolution forced Sharfman to give up his 
teaching post in China in law and political science to take a job on the staff of the National Civic 
Federation studying the regulation of public utilities. Id. Appointed in 1913 to lecture on 
political economy in the economics department at the University of Michigan, Sharfman 
remained at Michigan until his retirement in 1955. Isaiah L. Sharfman, Economist, Teacher, 
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Sharfman’s work was a comprehensive overview of the ICC’s 
work from 1887 to the 1930s, filled with long excerpts from 
Commission decisions and reports, and from Supreme Court 
opinions. On its opening pages, the work stated the Progressive 
explanation for the rise and value of administrative agencies: “the 
very existence of an expert and continuously functioning body has 
facilitated the evolution of governmental policies responsive to public 
needs and realistically adjusted to meet those needs.”
51 He concluded 
his third volume, published in 1935 and affected by the role of 
administrative agencies in the early New Deal, with a reflection on 
the possibility that the ICC would make “a courageous use of 
regulatory machinery” as it had in the past.
52 The ICC, he suggested, 
“may be blazing trails and accumulating experience, in a degree never 
suspected in 1920, toward a fuller public control of all industry.”
53 
Though the ICC was the model modern administrative agency, it 
was not perfect. Sometimes its commissioners erred. Most often their 
mistakes were not intrinsic to the administrative enterprise. So, for 
example, Congress might have asked them to address a discrete 
problem whose solution would interfere with the comprehensive 
regulatory system the ICC generally pursued.
54 Or the ICC might 
have misstepped because Congress had refused to give it the 
resources it needed to do its job.
55 On a more general level, the 
agency’s “determination to do ‘a common sense job’ was quite in 
accord with the [ICC’s] generally pragmatic processes. In terms of any 
 
 51.  1  SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 2. Sharfman repeated these views throughout his work, 
to ensure that a reader confronting volume two or four would learn what the reader who had 
started with volume one already knew. The fourth volume, for example, opened with a 
reference to the “constantly changing circumstances and conditions” under which the 
“development of regulatory policy could not have been achieved without resort to the 
administrative method of control.” 4 id. at 5 (1937). 
 52.  3A  id. at 627 (1935). 
 53.  Id. Sharfman was quite lavish with his praise of the Commission’s work. He offered 
“high commendation” to the Commission’s “successful attack” on “palpably indefensible forms 
of favoritism.” 3B id. at 755 (1936). The agency’s work during World War I was “sufficiently 
impressive to establish the need of removing the traditional legal obstacles to concert of action.” 
1 id. at 173. 
 54.  See  1  id.  at 225–27. A congressional directive to require that railroads provide 
“interchangeable mileage or scrip coupon tickets” was “passed largely under the pressure of 
commercial travelers’ organizations,” and “the fact that Congress has sought, directly, to further 
special ends, may exert an unwholesome influence upon the independence of the Commission 
and upon the dominance of the method of administrative control.” Id. at 226–27. 
 55.  See id. at 9 (“Both thoroughness of consideration and promptness of decision, which 
are presumed to characterize the administrative method of control, tend to become very 
difficult, if not impossible, of attainment.”). TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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absolute standard of accuracy, there was doubtless error; but such 
error was not grounded in arbitrary procedure, nor did it issue in 
flagrant departure from fact.”
56 
Occasionally, though, Sharfman hinted at, and may even himself 
have glimpsed, deeper difficulties with the administrative enterprise. 
The ICC’s core mission was to create a rational regulatory system for 
railroads, setting prices and determining routes that promoted 
national well-being.
57 Most of that work involved economics—using 
accounting principles to determine the present value of past capital 
investments or the replacement cost for existing capital. 
Sharfman also believed the ICC could have used economic 
science to determine the proper rate of return on investment. The 
difficulties the ICC encountered in doing so were technical, not 
normative. Sharfman understood that, in Congress’s view and the 
ICC’s, national well-being included more than mere economics. It 
included safety and providing access to rail transportation to 
otherwise isolated communities. Sharfman knew that integrating 
these “broad social ends” within an economically rational system 
plainly lay outside the domain of economic science and might 
undermine such a system: safety regulations, for example, had effects 
on the quality and cost of service, the ICC’s primary focus.
58 In effect, 
Sharfman threw up his hands, observing that the ICC had sensibly 
given relatively little weight to such social considerations. He did not 
seem to think that the ICC’s experience in this area had cast any 
doubt on the Progressive enterprise of deploying science and 
expertise in administrative agencies. 
Sharfman’s enthusiasm for administrative agencies gave him 
strong views about other organs of government. For him, all that 
Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts could do was 
interfere with the agency’s use of science and expertise. Congress had 
one positive role: it could create an administrative agency and then 
delegate authority to it in the broadest terms.
59 Otherwise, Congress 
 
 56.  3A  id. at 164–65 (1935). 
 57.  1  id. at 3–5. 
 58.  Id. at 248. 
  59.  Sharfman understood that “[t]he very existence and jurisdictional scope of these 
administrative agencies is dependent upon and constantly subject to modification by statutory 
enactment” and that the ICC was “constantly performing legislative functions . . . guided by the 
standards of action prescribed by Congress.” Id. at 287. But, he continued, “these standards are 
usually couched in such generality of terms as to leave open an almost uncharted discretion in 
the disposal of specific proceedings.” Id. at 7. The ICC was to determine whether rates were TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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had only negative effects on the administrative process. Prodded by 
narrow interest groups that lacked the comprehensive overview the 
ICC had, Congress would direct the ICC to solve some quite isolated 
problem. The ICC’s expertise often did not extend to the problem 
turned over to it, and even when the problem was generically 
appropriate, addressing it would undermine the ICC’s comprehensive 
plan for the railroad industry.
60 The ICC’s “tasks” were “so intimately 
intertwined” that “the more or less arbitrary infusion of extraneous 
influences, however well intentioned, [was] bound to render difficult 
the maintenance of unswerving adherence to reasoned conclusions 
and permanently significant standards of action.”
61 Sharfman 
understood the ICC’s “apparent sidetracking” of action in response 
to a congressional directive, though he could not bring himself to 
approve the “deliberate disregard of the legislative will.”
62 Sharfman’s 
skepticism about what Congress could contribute to the modern 
administrative state suggests that, for him, the best world would be 
one in which administrative agencies came into being by immaculate 
conception. 
The presidency was no better. Presidents tried “to mold the 
general course or direction of regulatory policy through manipulation 
of the appointing power.”
63 They assumed that “the Commission 
[was] part of the national administration and hence [was] a proper 
medium for the expression of political policy.”
64 But it was not—no 
more so than was the Supreme Court—“and executive influence 
[was] as manifestly out of place in the one case as it would be in the 
other.”
65 Sharfman thought that presidents should appoint experts to 
agencies, but too often they allowed narrow political considerations—
 
“just” and “reasonable” and in “the public interest,” but there were “no objective and definitive 
tests of ‘justness,’ or ‘reasonableness,’ or ‘public interest.’” Id. But “[w]ithin the bounds of such 
vaguely defined ends, the Commission . . . exercise[d] virtually unrestricted authority.” Id. at 
287–88. The absence of such objective tests ensured that the agency would have the flexibility 
needed to adapt solutions to ever-changing problems, and Congress had become accustomed to 
granting the agency such broad powers because “in great measure” it had been persuaded by 
the ICC’s “experience” and “influence” that broad delegations promoted the public good. Id. at 
2. 
 60.  See, e.g., id. at 229–30 (discussing Congress’s interest in the transport of agricultural 
products). 
 61.  Id. at 230–31. 
 62.  3A  id. at 482 (1935). 
 63.  2  id. at 453. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 454. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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geography being the most important one for the ICC—to dictate 
choice.
66 He had generally high regard for the ICC’s members, yet for 
him it was simply a happy coincidence that politics converged with 
expertise often enough. Nor did presidents provide the public support 
for the agency that it needed to become as important in the public’s 
mind as the courts were. Instead of urging that the public accept 
whatever the agency did as the result of the honest application of 
expertise, presidents evaluated the ICC’s work independently, on the 
merits rather than deferentially, and once again with politics primarily 
in mind.
67 
In Sharfman’s view, the courts, too, should have been kept away 
from administrative agencies. Courts saw the ICC’s work only when 
someone brought an appeal challenging an agency decision. That 
meant that they did not see how the agency was operating overall or 
how a particular decision, which might to an outsider seem 
questionable, fit into a larger scheme the ICC had developed. The 
early ICC “was hindered by the open hostility of the railroads and the 
unsympathetic attitude of the courts.”
68 
Fortunately, the era in which the courts were deeply hostile to 
administrative agencies had passed, and they had come to accept 
agencies as valuable instruments of modern governance.
69 
Constitutional doctrine was far more generous to the ICC than it had 
been in the agency’s early years—though not, in Sharfman’s eyes, 
quite generous enough. Thankfully, “the courts [had] adopted a 
dominantly self-denying attitude in matters of review,” although 
Sharfman could not resist observing that this “was not characteristic 
of the Commission’s status during the first two decades of its 
existence.”
70 When the courts looked at agency procedures, their 
sporadic interventions were rarely helpful, and Sharfman commended 
 
 66.  See id. at 458–65 & nn.211–14 (describing incidents in which presidential 
administrations were alleged to have unduly emphasized political considerations in the 
appointment of ICC personnel). 
 67.  See, e.g.,  id. at 455–58 (discussing examples from the Harding and Hoover 
administrations). 
 68.  1  id. at 23–24. 
 69.  See, e.g., id. at 7 (“Through a self-denying interpretation of their own functions in the 
prevailing scheme of control . . . the courts have progressively narrowed the scope of judicial 
review.”). 
 70.  2  id. at 385. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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the ICC for going to Congress for relief when judicial decisions had 
“left serious gaps in the Commission’s functioning jurisdiction.”
71 
Sharfman published his final volumes after the nation had seen 
how some early New Deal agencies operated, and the later books had 
a slightly more skeptical and less enthusiastic tone than the first 
volumes. Modern conditions, it seemed, deprived administrative 
agencies of the very advantages over courts and legislatures—the 
ability to take a comprehensive view and the ability to respond 
quickly to changing circumstances—around which Progressives had 
organized their defense of those agencies. Sharfman criticized the 
ICC for its “[f]ailure [during World War I] to recognize the 
seriousness of the war emergency,”
72 and for ignoring “the practical 
needs of the railroad situation during the critical years that were 
ushered in by the World War.”
73 He acknowledged that “[b]road 
adjustments [had] proved to be extremely complex and very difficult 
to carry out. They [were] too time-consuming to meet pressing 
demands and when completed changed circumstances [might] 
undermine their applicability.”
74 Responding in part to political 
challenges to the New Deal’s administrative apparatus and in part to 
their new understanding of how agencies actually operated, the 
Progressives’ heirs began to offer a more chastened view of the 
modern administrative state.
75 
C.  Freund and Dickinson on Administrative Law: Review of Law 
and Review of Facts 
Early in the twentieth century, Ernst Freund imported 
continental ideas about administrative law to the United States. 
Trained in Germany, Freund taught at the University of Chicago Law 
School, and, during the 1910s and early 1920s, he was the leading 
figure in the field of administrative law.
76 Freund’s scholarship 
focused on using law to bring administrative discretion under control. 
 
 71.  Id. at 423. 
 72.  3B  id. at 92 (1936). 
 73.  Id. at 94. 
 74.  Id. at 765. 
 75.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 149, 158 (1995) (noting that 1960s intellectuals “began to argue that regulatory 
agencies were costly to operate and often prone to error”). 
  76.  Frankfurter surpassed Freund as the 1920s proceeded. For an account of the 
intellectual and institutional competition between Freund and Frankfurter, see generally Ernst, 
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Legislatures would exercise that control in the first instance by 
carefully delineating the domain of administrative discretion. Freund 
had great hopes for legislative control of administrative discretion, 
but he understood that some discretion would always remain with 
administrative agencies. They could comply with the rule of law, 
Freund thought, by incrementally moving from broad discretionary 
standards to more precise rules, and indeed perhaps even better rules 
than the legislature could devise.
77 For Freund, this was the model of 
how the rule of law would operate in the administrative state: careful 
delegation of power by legislatures, coupled with the elaboration of 
rules by agencies themselves. 
Administrative law in the United States adopted part of Freund’s 
solution, as courts tried to insist that legislatures give real guidance to 
administrative agencies. But by the 1920s, that effort had largely 
failed, as Freund may have understood. Yet American administrative 
law barely had a theory of administrative self-regulation—rules 
generated within agencies that would govern their own activities and 
that would fit agencies into a rule-of-law regime. Instead, U.S. 
administrative law unquestioningly accepted another part of the late-
nineteenth-century compromise: courts would have full power to 
review agencies’ decisions interpreting the law those agencies were 
administering. Frankfurter’s students chastised Freund for advocating 
strict legislative control of administrative discretion, without fully 
appreciating Freund’s admittedly secondary mechanism of evolving 
rules from standards.
78 
Unrestricted judicial review of agency legal interpretations, 
though, was in tension with the vision of administrative autonomy 
held by Progressive theorists. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court, 
 
 77.  Ernst  Freund,  The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 666, 669, 671–72 (1915) (“Administrative action has . . . the indisputable . . . advantage, 
that it permits the process of establishing rules to be surrounded by procedural guaranties and 
other inherent checks which will tend to produce a more impartial consideration than the 
legislature is apt to give, and [this] should in course of time, if not immediately, substitute 
principle for mere discretion. . . . [Agencies would] evolve principle out of constantly recurrent 
action.”). 
  78.  John Dickinson, Book Review, 22 AM.  POL.  SCI.  REV.  981, 985 (1928) (reviewing 
ERNST  FREUND,  ADMINISTRATIVE  POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY:  A 
COMPARATIVE  SURVEY (1928); JOHN  PRESTON  COMER,  LEGISLATIVE  FUNCTIONS OF 
NATIONAL  ADMINISTRATIVE  AUTHORITIES (1927)) (criticizing Freund for treating 
administrative discretion as “of necessity inherently bad, and [assuming] that all questions can 
be justly decided by the yard-stick of fixed rules”). For other criticisms by Frankfurter’s 
students, see Ernst, supra note 39, at 184. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
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protective of the judicial role, provided little help for Progressive 
theorists seeking to develop an account of agency autonomy over 
interpreting statutes. Still, by the end of the 1930s, Progressive 
theorists began to glimpse a path to such autonomy. They argued, and 
the Court came to agree, that agencies should have substantial leeway 
in determining facts. But, as John Dickinson had urged in his 1927 
treatise on administrative law, the distinction between facts and law 
was vague, and drawing it inevitably implicated the very policy 
questions that Progressive theorists believed the agencies themselves 
should decide. For Dickinson, it was impossible “to establish a clear 
line between so-called ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact’ by any 
substantive test of definition.”
79 Rather, “[A]ny factual state or 
relation which the courts  .  .  .  regard as sufficiently important to be 
made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar character becomes 
thereby  a  matter  of  law . . . .”
80 Administrative agencies applied 
general standards to “bridge[] th[e] gap” between “the special 
subsidiary facts . . . and the ultimate conclusion.”
81 Doing so was 
factfinding. The theorists pressed hard to move the line dividing facts 
from law, seeking to place as much as they could in the domain of 
facts and therefore to guard against aggressive judicial scrutiny. They 
achieved little before the early 1940s. 
D.  A New Vision Begins to Emerge 
By the end of the decade, defenders of the administrative state 
began to sketch a different defense: agencies were locations in which 
democratic politics could occur. 
In 1941, Walter Gellhorn described three “great phases” of the 
judicial confrontation with the administrative state. In the first, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, “alarmed lawyers turned to judges who 
were equally alarmed to save what they could from the ravening 
administrators.”
82 This “begot the impulse to extend and extend 
judicial review of administration determinations.”
83 In the second 
phase, “the burning question was whether and how much a court 
 
 79.  JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 312 (1927). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 315. 
 82.  WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 42 (1941). 
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could review (and, in reviewing, revise) administrative judgments.”
84 
Judicial review alone was ineffective, though, partly because judges 
“were sometimes less than supermen and were therefore themselves 
capable of erring,”
85 and partly because judges could not “reach more 
than a tiny segment of the administrative output.”
86 The second phase, 
Progressive commentators agreed, resulted in a tempering of the 
judicial impulse to extend judicial review.
87 
The third phase, according to Gellhorn, “addressed . . . the 
procedure of administration itself.”
88 For James Landis, “The positive 
reason for declining judicial review over administrative findings of 
fact is the belief that the expertness of the administrative, if guarded 
by adequate procedures, can be trusted to determine these issues as 
capably as judges.”
89 Gellhorn, too, was skeptical about “push[ing] 
beyond the antechamber into the atmosphere of the courtroom.”
90 
Administrators should not “slavishly emulate judicial models.”
91 
Agencies had developed adjudicatory techniques that were “surely 
the equal of and very probably superior to the more orthodox 
processes.”
92 Agencies administering social welfare benefits, for 
example, were able to gather information “quick[ly] and 
inexpensive[ly].”
93 Their hearings had “no adversary positions, no 
cross-examination, no witness chairs. The claimant [told] his story as 
he please[d]; sources outside the ‘hearing’ [were] freely admitted.”
94 
Sharfman’s summary of the ICC’s approach to procedure 
emphasized the Commission’s “flexible adjustment of its practices to 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 43. 
  87.  To quote Sharfman, “Through a self-denying interpretation of their own functions in 
the prevailing scheme of control . . . the courts have progressively narrowed the scope of judicial 
review.” 1 SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 7; see also 2 id. at 347 (“For more than two decades . . . 
the occasions and grounds of judicial review have been progressively narrowed . . . . This result 
has been largely accomplished by the courts themselves . . . .”); 2 id. at 385 (“[T]he courts have 
adopted a dominantly self-denying attitude in matters of review. .  . . [T]here is a broad and 
significant zone in which the Commission’s determinations are clothed with finality . . . . [This] 
was not characteristic of the Commission’s status during the first two decades of its existence.”). 
 88.  GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 43. 
 89.  LANDIS, supra note 6, at 142. 
 90.  GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 60–61. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 68. 
 93.  Id. 
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meet distinctive needs,”
95 and, referring to the Commission’s 
treatment of evidentiary questions, concluded that “the Commission 
has proceeded in the spirit of the determinations of the courts, 
infringing upon when necessary, rather than disregarding as a matter 
of principle, the established standards.”
96 For Sharfman, “Not only is 
the administrative method  .  .  .  indispensable to sound and realistic 
adjustment of complex relationships in the public interest, but 
through the employment of quasi-judicial methods it has flexibly but 
successfully safeguarded all essential private rights.”
97 
Sharfman’s reference to “infringements” of judicial standards for 
the admissibility of evidence was telling. His claim that the 
Commission did not reject the judicial model “as a matter of 
principle” was undermined by his celebration of the Commission’s 
procedural flexibility.
98 Perhaps the Commission did not reject the 
judicial model as a matter of principle, but it clearly—and to 
Sharfman appropriately—was not committed to that model as a 
matter of principle from which departures should be made 
grudgingly. Sometimes the Commission’s choice of quasi-judicial 
procedures converged with the judicial model, not because of 
principle but from a contingent evaluation of what the Commission, 
not the courts, regarded as a proper accommodation of the public 
interest and the demands of fairness. In 1941, Gellhorn offered the 
comforting suggestion that “[t]he gap between administrative and 
judicial practice is fast narrowing”
99 because of transformations in the 
courts’ approach to procedure—arguably, a vindication of the 
agencies’ insistence on procedural flexibility.
100 
The Progressives’ theory of administrative procedure in the 
1930s remained what it had been from the outset. In principle, they 
believed, agencies should have complete discretion to choose the 
procedures determined by experts in the field to be suitable to the 
particular problems facing each agency.
101 Robert Cooper, a special 
 
 95.  4  SHARFMAN, supra note 16, at 244 (1937). 
 96.  Id. at 212. 
 97.  Id. at 255–56 (footnote omitted). 
 98.  See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 99.  GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 79. 
 100. See id. at 78–79 (“Today’s clamorous accusations that administrative agencies flout the 
laws of evidence will . . . soon subside. The courts themselves are destroying rigidity in the rules, 
leaving them flexible enough to meet varied needs.”). 
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assistant to Attorney General Homer Cummings, offered a 
particularly forceful statement in 1938: those who supported what he 
called “the doctrine of judicial infallibility” were 
presumably of the opinion that an independent tribunal endowed 
with the antiquated or cumbersome methods of legal procedure, 
steeped in the traditions of the common law and completely isolated 
from the previous steps in the administrative process, is the most 
suitable agency to determine finally the existence of certain basic 
facts pertaining to an administrative controversy.
102 
Circumstances would sometimes force agencies to depart from this 
principle, but those departures were extraneous impositions on 
agencies.
103 
Yet looming over all this was the specter of an administrative 
state completely divorced from democratic control.
104 By the early 
1930s, Soviet Russia and fascist Italy had replaced bureaucratic 
France as the image of the administrative state degenerating into 
tyranny, to be joined in the next few years by Nazi Germany. 
Defending “democracy [as] the reign of reason on the most extensive 
scale,”
105 Frankfurter observed in 1930 that “[s]ensational and violent 
rule in Russia and Italy throws out of perspective more plodding 
popular institutions.”
106 How, though, were those plodding institutions 
to be truly popular if they were staffed by professionals and experts? 
Toward the end of the 1930s, Progressive theorists found themselves 
pressed to defend the democratic legitimacy of administrative 
agencies more vigorously than they had at the decade’s outset. 
Sometimes they sounded older themes, but the more perceptive of 
them began to develop the idea that agency processes themselves 
could be a form of democratic participation in decisionmaking. 
To some extent, the Progressive theorists of the administrative 
state simply asserted that the norms of the experts’ professions were 
 
and foresight, administration must first be accorded a status of autonomy with the functional 
structure of the State.”). 
 102. Id. at 595. 
 103. See id. at 601–02 (“If the concept of an autonomous system of administration is 
generally considered to be irreconcilable with the indispensable safeguards against unlawful 
administrative action by reference to the assumption of judicial superiority, popular government 
will inevitably give way to a more efficient form of political authority.”). 
  104.  For a discussion of Albert Venn Dicey’s criticisms of the inherent lack of democratic 
accountability in administrative regimes, see infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
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enough to give popular sanction to the technical exercises in which 
the professionals were engaged.
107 Frankfurter acknowledged that 
“agitation and advocacy have their place” as “instruments of 
education.”
108 But, he continued, “the quiet, detached, laborious task 
of disentangling facts from fiction, of extracting reliable information 
from interested parties, of agreeing on what is proof and what 
surmise, must precede, if agitation is to feed on knowledge and 
reality.”
109 
Professionalism alone, then, was insufficient to give the actions 
of administrative agencies the popular warrant they required. 
Gellhorn argued in 1941 that the very procedures designed to ensure 
fairness to the subjects of regulation also “democratize[d] our 
governmental processes,” because they “[brought] to the interests 
and individuals immediately affected an opportunity to shape the 
course of regulation, modeling it to fit the contours of their own 
special problems.”
110 “Officials in constantly increasing numbers,” he 
continued, were “perceiving the significant mutuality of gain flowing 
from private participation in the administrative process.”
111 That 
perception led them to “improve the tools”—the procedures they 
used—for “securing” that participation.
112 Gellhorn understood that 
this raised “certain possibilities of excess” when “official mechanisms 
[came] wholly under the control of outside pressures.”
113 But he did 
not see “any element of impropriety in this development,”
114 because 
it was “the almost inevitable concomitant of concentration upon a 
somewhat homogeneous area of control.”
115 For Gellhorn, “A real 
picture of government regulation of an industry would not always 
show two scowling antagonists, but rather more often two smiling 
collaborators.”
116 Without any apparent irony intended, Gellhorn 
wrote that this was “a very pleasant prospect, indeed, and one which 
 
 107. See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 6, at 98–99 (arguing that because agencies “move[] in a 
narrow field,” a “professionalism of spirit” will constrain the administrative state and assure 
“informed and balanced judgments”). 
 108. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 153. 
 109. Id. 
 110. GELLHORN, supra note 82, at 122. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 131. 
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one would not care to alter—so long as the administrative agency 
maintains a residual distinction between governmental regulation and 
industrial self-regulation.”
117 After all, “the unorganized public 
interest is represented by the agency and . . . there is today no 
effective substitute for that type of representation.”
118 
E. Summary 
By the end of the 1930s, the Progressive theory of administrative 
law had begun to take on a new shape. Progressives still sought to 
free agencies from close judicial supervision. They pressed the courts 
to characterize issues as involving facts—the agencies’ proper 
domain—rather than law, the domain of the courts. Experience had 
shown, though, that agencies were deeply implicated in politics and 
that expertise offered no escape. Incorporating politics into the 
theory of administrative law remained a challenge for Progressives. 
They started to meet that challenge as they considered what the 
Supreme Court had done with administrative law during the decade. 
II.  THE COURTS’ ROLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The Supreme Court weighed in on administrative law in a series 
of cases during the 1930s, both before and after New Deal legislation 
created an efflorescence of new agencies such as the SEC, the NLRB, 
and others. As the 1930s proceeded—both before and after the New 
Deal—constitutional and administrative law moved, more haltingly 
than Frankfurter and other Progressives hoped but further than they 
acknowledged, toward the Progressive ideal. Frankfurter and other 
Progressives, including dissenting Justices, saw the Court’s decisions 
as a mix of persistent resistance to the modes of governance required 
by modern society with grudging but quite modest accommodation of 
traditional doctrine to new problems. Yet the Progressive agenda for 
administrative law was, in essence, to liberate agencies from judicial 
supervision so that technocracy guided loosely by politics could 
replace law. Nothing the Court could do other than withdraw 
completely from the field would have comported with that agenda. 
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The Hughes Court’s decisions transformed administrative law 
without going that far. They greatly expanded the boundaries within 
which administrative agencies could operate free of significant 
judicial supervision, although the true breadth of the Hughes Court’s 
concessions to those agencies would not be apparent until the 1940s, 
after Hughes had passed from the scene. As in much of the Hughes 
Court’s work, the Court here moved into the terrain Roosevelt’s 
appointees hoped the Court would occupy, but left them unsure 
about the Court’s exact position. Still, the Progressive critique of 
traditional doctrines of administrative law gave them clear ideas 
about how to move forward. 
A.  Background: Administrative Law to 1930 
Writing in 1885 and concerned about the incipient displacement 
of the common law by administrative law, British jurist Albert Venn 
Dicey asserted that the first requirement of the rule of law was that 
“no man . . . can be lawfully made to suffer . . . except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary Courts of the land.”
119 Dicey’s target was the French system 
of  droit administratif, which he expressly described as a system of 
unbridled discretion.
120 When his work traveled across the Atlantic, 
few proponents of new administrative agencies had anything like that 
in mind. Yet the translation was too obvious to avoid, and Dicey’s 
dictum became an important component of the conservative 
resistance to the development of a distinctive administrative law in 
the United States. 
Progressive defenders of the modern administrative state could 
not accept Dicey’s conception of the rule of law. The whole point of 
modern administrative law, in their view, was to supplant the 
cumbersome procedures of the “ordinary courts” with agencies that 
could rely on their expertise to dispense with some of those 
procedures, more deftly responding to rapid social and economic 
change, and more efficiently handling cases in large numbers. As the 
Progressives increasingly theorized their commitments, they came 
close to endorsing the proposition that administrative agencies ought 
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to exercise unbridled discretion. Reality could not match their 
theories, of course, and by the 1920s Progressives and conservatives 
had reached an accommodation of sorts. 
Progressives continued to resist Dicey’s view in principle. When 
they could, they disdained the use of the procedures of ordinary 
courts. Juvenile courts, for example, ran on principles that departed 
significantly from those used down the hall in criminal courts.
121 
Elsewhere, though, powerful opponents forced Progressives to 
compromise their principles. As Henderson’s work showed, economic 
regulatory agencies in particular adopted procedures strongly 
resembling those of ordinary courts.
122 Progressives understood that 
agency hearings—whether to enforce regulations or to develop 
investigative reports—had to ensure some degree of fairness, and 
lawyers heading the agencies and serving on their staffs naturally took 
the procedures of the ordinary courts as the starting point. Still, 
principle demanded that agencies not be required to mirror the courts 
exactly. 
Representatives of the business community compromised as 
well. The leading thinkers among them appreciated some of the 
advantages of independent agencies. Experts might be more 
responsive to their concerns than legislatures that could fall under the 
sway of populist political forces. As Elihu Root put it at New York’s 
constitutional convention in 1913, legislators offered “a multitude of 
strike bills introduced for the purpose of holding up the corporations, 
holding them up and calling them down,” to which corporations 
responded by getting involved—and, as Root put it, creating “a 
scandal and a disgrace”—in politics.
123 Agency proceedings might 
move more quickly to an acceptable conclusion than judicial ones. 
Coming to terms with regulatory agencies meant accepting some 
departures from the procedures used in the ordinary courts, but not 
departures that were too substantial. Hewing closely to ordinary 
courts’ procedures had the added advantage of giving the lawyers 
 
  121.  For an overview of the early history of juvenile courts and its connection to 
Progressivism, see generally VICTORIA GETIS, THE JUVENILE COURTS & THE PROGRESSIVES 
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who represented businesses in court the opportunity to extend their 
representation to administrative agencies.
124 
By the 1920s the law regarding administrative procedures had 
stabilized. Although there was no “general” administrative law, but 
merely statutes dealing with individual agencies or a general law 
dealing with judicial review of executive action, lawyers understood 
the patterns that had emerged. Administrative agencies could indeed 
depart from traditional judicial procedures, and across a rather wide 
range of matters courts would accept their decisions.
125 In 1934, Justice 
Cardozo wrote for a unanimous Court reversing a lower court 
decision that had overturned an FTC ruling.
126 Citing the statutory 
provision that the FTC’s factual findings, “if supported by testimony, 
shall be conclusive,” the Court chastised the lower court for giving 
this provision “lip service only” by “picking and choosing for itself 
among uncertain and conflicting inferences.”
127 The reviewing court 
should not become “an administrative body which is to try the case 
anew.”
128 This was, as Cardozo observed, well-established law.
129 The 
Supreme Court occasionally asserted that administrative decisions 
were presumed to be correct, although of course such a presumption 
was inevitably flexible.
130 The open questions involved determining 
the limits of departures from the conclusiveness of agency decisions. 
The proliferation of agencies in the New Deal placed this 
accommodation under substantial pressure. In part the pressure arose 
from the fact that some aspects of agency decisionmaking did not 
involve anything that could have been classified as scientific expertise 
in traditional terms and, concomitantly, that some aspects of agency 
decisionmaking were political in a straightforward sense. William 
 
 124. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and 
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that deference to adjudications by customs officials “will leave the administration of the law 
where the law intends it should be left; to the attention of officers made alert to attempts at 
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  126.  FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 82 (1934). 
 127. Id. at 73. 
 128. Id. at 77. 
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Leiserson, appointed to the NLRB in 1939, was an experienced 
arbitrator and mediator
131 who surely believed that there was indeed a 
science to resolving disputes between labor and management.
132 But 
the NLRB as a whole was a politicized body whose claims to 
expertise were regularly belied by its decisions and by the evident 
partiality of its staff, including the lawyers.
133 The ICC, the object of 
Sharfman’s and Frankfurter’s admiration,
134 may have set the gold 
standard for administrative agencies. Elite lawyers, including a 
majority on the Supreme Court, understood that not every agency 
measured up to that standard. Progressive claims about the inherent 
fairness of decisions made by independent and expert agencies rang 
hollow, or at least hollow enough to threaten to undo the 
accommodations reached in prior decades. The Hughes Court 
struggled to develop an administrative law that itself accommodated 
the varied performance of the agencies it supervised. 
B.  The Supreme Court Weighs In: The St. Joseph Stock Yards Case 
The first major dustup over the New Deal approach to 
administrative law occurred in 1936, concurrent with what New 
Dealers saw as the Court’s attack on the New Deal itself. The case, St. 
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
135 involved an ordinary 
ratemaking proceeding, and the issue before the Supreme Court was 
the scope of judicial review of agency factfinding.
136 Stockyards were a 
crucial stop in meat’s journey from ranch to table.
137 Cattlemen and 
other ranchers shipped their stock by train to the stockyards.
138 There, 
“commission men” hired by the stockyard unloaded the stock from 
the trains and drove the animals to pens, where they provided the 
animals with food and water until the animals were sold.
139 Stockyards 
charged fees for these services. Indeed, because each city had no 
 
 131. EARL LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON: FROM THE NEW 
DEAL TO MCCARTHY 140–41 (1966); see also National Affairs: Two Nice Men, TIME, May 8, 
1939, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761206,00.html. 
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  133.  For a discussion of investigations of Communist Party influence within the NLRB, see 
id. at 124–50. 
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  135.  St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1935). 
 136. Id. at 45. 
 137. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515–16 (1922) (detailing the importance of 
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more than a few stockyards,
140 the commission men were able to 
charge monopoly prices for their services.
141 
Responding to pressure from ranchers and shippers, Congress in 
1921 enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act.
142 Using language 
drawn from the statute authorizing the ICC to set railroad rates, the 
Act gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power to set maximum 
rates for the services stockyards provided.
143 Within the department, 
the Secretary assigned the task of rate-setting to the Bureau of 
Animal Industry, headed by a well-published veterinarian, John R. 
Mohler, who led the Bureau from 1917 to 1943.
144 According to 
testimony given to a 1940 inquiry into how agencies actually 
operated, the Bureau had a “live-and-let-live policy” toward the 
commission men and generally acceded to their claims about the level 
of rates needed to ensure profitability.
145 
In 1929 R.W. Dunlap, the Acting Secretary pending the 
confirmation of a permanent cabinet member, opened an inquiry into 
the charges at the stockyard in St. Joseph, Missouri, which serviced 
cattle and other animals for the Swift and Armour meatpacking 
companies.
146 By February 1931, Arthur Hyde—confirmed as 
Secretary of Agriculture shortly after Dunlap’s initial action—had not 
reached a decision, and the stockyard operator petitioned to reopen 
the hearing to take account of the changed circumstances occasioned 
by the Great Depression. The Secretary denied the petition and, in 
July 1931, lowered the rates previously charged by the stockyard. The 
stockyard sued to bar the Secretary from enforcing the rate order, 
arguing that he should have reopened the hearing. The three-judge 
district court to which the case was assigned agreed. Hyde then 
 
 140. See  Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514–15 (noting the problems of monopoly that animated 
passage of the laws regulating stockyards). 
 141. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 68–69. 
  142.  Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 181–229c (2006)); see also Stafford, 258 U.S. at 513–16 (describing the conditions that led to 
the enactment of the Packers and Stockyards Act). 
 143. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514 (noting that the Packers and Stockyards Act allows the 
Secretary of Agriculture to “make rules and regulations to carry out the provisions, to fix rates, 
or a minimum or maximum thereof”). 
  144.  Daniel R. Ernst, Morgan and the New Dealers, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 448, 450 (2008). 
 145. Id. (quoting Transcript of Proceedings Before the Att’y Gen.’s Comm. on Admin. 
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conducted a new hearing starting in 1932.
147 As a result of that 
hearing, Rexford Tugwell, the Acting Secretary of Agriculture, 
entered a new rate order in January 1934.
148 In February, Henry 
Wallace, the new Secretary of Agriculture, heard the stockyard’s 
argument against the rates, but in May he confirmed the order. His 
findings occupied more than one hundred pages in the record 
submitted to the Supreme Court.
149 Wallace ordered that the 
stockyard lower some of its rates—ones he found unreasonable and 
discriminatory—while freezing others at their existing levels.
150 He 
allowed the stockyard to charge sixty cents above the market price for 
hay,
151 for example, rather than the sixty-five to seventy cents the 
stockyard had been charging.
152 Wallace’s decision may have been 
motivated by his populist discomfort with agricultural middlemen, but 
the Hoover administration’s agency had also pushed for a reduction 
in the commission men’s rates.
153 
After Wallace ordered the new, lower rates, the stockyard 
operator again petitioned to reopen the hearing, this time citing the 
changes the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act were about to bring to the industry.
154 Wallace denied 
the petition, and the stockyard again sought an injunction from the 
district court.
155 The company asserted that Wallace should have 
reopened the hearing and that the rates he had set were 
unconstitutionally confiscatory.
156 
After a defeat in the district court, the stockyard appealed the 
Secretary’s order to the Supreme Court. The company insisted that 
the Secretary had misvalued many of the company’s assets—for 
example, its land and a commercial hotel used by shippers and truck 
drivers—and, as a result, had set the rates too low to generate the 
ordinary rate of return that the Constitution required. The district 
court had lamented that “heavily burdened courts [were] compelled 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
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 150. Id. at 6. 
 151. Id. Ex. A, at 128. 
 152. Id. Ex. A, at 42. 
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to examine every separate matter.”
157 That lament was supported by 
the massive record in the case and, even more, by the briefs filed in 
the company’s appeal. The abstract of the record ran to 1,648 printed 
pages, with 1,358 additional pages of exhibits, maps, photographs, and 
what Justice Brandeis later referred to as “reading matter.”
158 The 
company’s brief ran to 185 pages, with a separate appendix “prepared 
in order that the brief itself may be kept within reasonable limits.”
159 
The government’s brief, too, had an appendix, albeit a short one. But 
the substantive brief ended on page 205.
160 
The briefs’ bulk resulted from their canvassing of each 
challenged finding of fact. Both sides saw the “scope of review” 
question as key. The government did its best to minimize the issue, 
although it preferred a standard under which the courts would uphold 
agency findings of fact supported by “some evidence.”
161 The 
summary of its argument said, “In view of the fact that the record 
fully sustains the Secretary’s order on any theory of judicial review, 
the question of the scope of judicial review is not material in this 
case.”
162 Only after almost two hundred pages devoted to the 
valuation issues did the brief return to the scope-of-review issue.
163 
The stockyard’s brief, in contrast, put the issue first and treated it 
as dispositive. The discussion opened with an unannotated list of 
nineteen cases that it asserted supported the view that courts should 
exercise “independent judgment” about what the record 
established.
164 Then, analyzing the district court’s opinion, the brief 
said that that court had gone “no further than to ascertain whether 
there was some evidence to sustain the Secretary” and “did not even 
weigh the evidence . . . to decide whether the Secretary’s evidence 
sustained the conclusions stated.”
165 The brief then quoted snippets 
 
  157.  St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 328 (W.D. Mo. 1935). 
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 161. Id. at 199–204. 
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from each of the nineteen cases, an “unbroken line” adopting the 
independent-judgment rule.
166 
Justices Stone and Cardozo observed that the independent-
judgment rule was fully supported by precedents that they believed 
were mistaken.
167 They would have “acquiesce[d]” in an opinion that 
simply applied those precedents.
168 But, they thought, Chief Justice 
Hughes’s opinion for the Court tried to do more: “[t]he opinion 
reexamines the foundations of the rule that it declares, and finds them 
to be firm and true.”
169 And indeed it did, but perhaps because 
Hughes believed that the government was contending for an 
extremely restrictive scope for judicial review of agency findings of 
facts bearing on constitutional questions. The government’s proposed 
test used language concerning compulsion.
170 This suggested that the 
government’s test was more like “some evidence to support the 
agency’s findings” rather than “substantial evidence.” Hughes’s 
opinion for the Court rehearsed the arguments for the independent-
judgment test without framing the contrary position in terms of 
“substantial evidence.”
171 
For Hughes, the scope-of-review issue was directly connected to 
the Constitution’s supremacy. Sounding a realistic note, he observed 
that “agencies . . . work in a field peculiarly exposed to political 
demands. Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient.”
172 
Making agency findings “conclusive where constitutional rights of 
liberty and property are involved . . . is to place those rights at the 
mercy of administrative officials.”
173 For Hughes, “That prospect, with 
our multiplication of administrative agencies, is not one to be lightly 
regarded.”
174 Although Hughes did not spell it out, the connection 
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evidence for itself and determines that it does not compel arrival at different conclusions of fact 
than those reached by the rate-making authority.”). 
 171. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 50–54. 
 172. Id. at 52. 
 173. Id. 
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between these concerns and his references to “political demands” and 
“subservient” agencies is clear: independent judgment on facts 
bearing on constitutional rights was necessary to guard against the 
possibility that a subservient agency would twist its factual findings in 
response to political demands. 
Yet this did not mean that courts should simply disregard what 
the agency had done. The courts’ task “may be greatly facilitated” 
and “informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert 
legislative agency.”
175 The courts were to look at the record as a 
whole, there was a “strong presumption in favor of the conclusions 
reached by an experienced administrative body after a full hearing,”
176 
and the regulated entity had to make “a convincing showing” that 
rates were so low as to amount to confiscation.
177 Summarizing, 
Hughes wrote that “findings made by a legislative agency after [a] 
hearing will not be disturbed save as in particular instances they are 
plainly shown to be overborne.”
178 
After reaffirming the independent-judgment test with all the 
qualifications, Hughes’s opinion turned to the valuation questions 
and systematically affirmed the district court’s decisions on each 
one.
179 The discussion occupied nearly twenty pages in the U.S. 
Reports, compared to the six devoted to the scope-of-review 
question. The result was to uphold the district court’s decision that 
the new rates did not violate the Constitution.
180 
Justice Brandeis agreed with that outcome—as did Justices Stone 
and Cardozo—but rejected the independent-judgment rule in favor of 
a “substantial evidence” test.
181 All that the Constitution required, 
according to Brandeis, was a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal 
that reached a conclusion supported by the evidence; it did not 
require an inquiry “into the correctness of . . . findings of subsidiary 
facts.”
182 Citing Ng Fung Ho v. White,
183 his own decision on de novo 
review of the question of citizenship, Brandeis distinguished between 
 
 175. Id. at 53. 
 176. Id. (quoting Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 569 (1917)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 54. 
 179. Id. at 55–72. 
 180. Id. at 72. 
 181. Id. at 73 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“I think no good reason exists for making special 
exception of issues of fact bearing upon a constitutional right.”). 
 182. Id. at 73–74. 
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“the right to liberty of person and other constitutional rights.”
184 
Courts had to determine facts implicating the former, but Brandeis 
devoted several pages to describing “a multitude of decisions [that] 
tells us that when dealing with property a much more liberal rule 
applies.”
185 
Brandeis catalogued the grounds on which decisions could be 
overturned on the basis of inadequate evidence. The formulations 
ranged from a “lack of findings necessary to support” the decision to 
a decision’s being “made without evidence.”
186 Brandeis offered 
another formulation: “whether there was evidence upon which 
reasonable men could have found as the Secretary did.”
187 These 
standards resonated with the quite loose “no evidence” standard that 
Hughes seemed to find in the government’s position. No “rigid rule” 
governed; rather, the Court “ha[d] followed the rule of reason” and 
“ha[d] weighed the relative value of constitutional rights, the 
essentials of powers conferred, and the need of protecting both.”
188 
Brandeis had to face up to seemingly adverse precedents, but in the 
end he reverted to fundamentals. “The supremacy of law demands 
that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an 
erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in 
which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly.”
189 
Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1938, Ralph Fuchs saw in St. 
Joseph Stock Yards a “quite clear[] . . . distrust of administrative 
agencies and a belief in the superiority of the courts,”
190 and he 
connected that decision to the Diceyan tradition.
191 Echoing 
Brandeis’s observation that the Supreme Court “has recognized that 
there is a limit to the capacity of judges, and [that] the magnitude of 
the task imposed upon them . . . may prevent prompt and faithful 
performance,”
192 Robert Cooper in the same issue described Crowell 
v. Benson
193 as resting on a “presumption of judicial infallibility” 
 
 184. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 77 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Ng Fung Ho, 
259 U.S. at 282–85). 
 185. Id. at 77–82. 
 186. Id. at 74. 
 187. Id. at 83. 
 188. Id. at 81–82. 
 189. Id. at 84. 
 190. Fuchs,  supra note 36, at 565. 
 191. Id. at 557–59. 
 192. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 81 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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about finding “facts in the absolute.”
194 These were clear 
overstatements. The practical distance between Hughes’s position 
and Brandeis’s was quite small, although the ideological and 
methodological distance may have been larger.
195 
Hughes rejected the most extreme position he thought the 
government might be taking: that agency findings of fact had to be 
accepted by the courts if those findings were supported by any 
evidence at all.
196 In form, he rejected the proposition that such 
findings had to be accepted if they were supported by substantial 
evidence. Yet he followed his rejection of that proposition with 
statement after statement indicating that courts would be well advised 
to give substantial weight to the agencies’ findings.
197 And, notably, 
the entire controversy involved only findings of fact bearing on the 
question of whether the agency action violated the Constitution. That 
the substantial-evidence test applied to other agency findings was 
accepted by all.
198 
Hughes’s analysis in St. Joseph Stock Yards looked backward to a 
legal world in which, as Brandeis put it, “rigid rules” governed in an 
on-or-off fashion: independent judgment on facts bearing on 
constitutional violations, some evidence for other facts.
199 Brandeis’s 
was a typically nonformalist, legal-realist approach in which interests 
were to be balanced. But Hughes’s opinion had its realistic elements 
as well. Even the Progressive theorists of administrative law 
understood that what Hughes described as the “multiplication of 
administrative agencies” undermined the Progressive claim that all 
agencies were equally expert.
200 Brandeis envisioned a world in which 
administrative agencies were professional and expert, and relied on a 
 
 194. Cooper,  supra note 36, at 593–94. 
  195.  Brandeis was disturbed that rates the Secretary had determined to be excessive had 
been in effect for more than six years after Dunlap began the inquiry and for more than two 
years after Wallace’s decision, and Brandeis cited a number of other cases in which review of 
ratemaking had taken years. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 88–92 (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). After the Court’s clarification of the proper standard of review, though, delays 
could be expected to diminish. 
 196. Id. at 50–53 (majority opinion). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 51; id.  at  73 (Brandeis, J., concurring); id.  at 93–94 (Stone & Cardozo, JJ., 
concurring); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 230 (1938) (holding 
the National Labor Relations Act’s directive that NLRB findings were conclusive “if supported 
by evidence” to require “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might adopt as adequate 
to support a conclusion”). 
 199. St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. at 50–53. 
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seemingly infallible judiciary to take variations in expertise and 
ability into account when balancing interests. Hughes explicitly 
recognized imperfections in agencies, and his formalism implicitly 
recognized the difficulty imperfect judges would have in accurately 
determining which agencies deserved greater deference, which less. 
Imperfect courts exercising independent judgment in all cases might 
produce a better accommodation of competing interests than 
imperfect courts attempting to balance the interests directly. 
Under Hughes’s approach, the courts nominally exercised 
independent judgment. Giving “weight” to an agency’s findings is not 
the same as treating those findings as conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence, but the difference is not large. Cooper thought 
that the “mental gymnastics” required by Hughes’s formulations were 
“beyond the capacity of even the greatest human intellect.”
201 If so, 
the decision would be a victory in practice for the Progressive 
conception of administrative law: agency actions would be routinely 
upheld because courts could not perform the “mental gymnastics” 
required to distinguish between constitutional and ordinary facts and 
between “some evidence” and “substantial evidence.” For Hughes, 
though, leaving the decision in the courts’ hands—no matter how 
little that might matter in any case—preserved what was left of the 
Diceyan tradition in U.S. administrative law. Once again, Hughes 
looked backward and forward at the same time. 
C.  The SEC as a “Star Chamber”? 
A week after the oral arguments in St. Joseph Stock Yards, the 
Court heard J. Edward Jones’s challenge to efforts by the SEC to 
investigate his practices as a dealer in oil royalties. Jones was the 
flamboyant chair of the National Petroleum Council, which purported 
to represent independent oil producers, and a fervent opponent of 
government regulation of his business practices.
202 He offered his 
clients rights to participate in the distribution of royalties from oil 
fields; the SEC believed that he inflated the likely returns from the 
royalties and sometimes used earnings from other securities to pay off 
the oil royalties in something like a Ponzi scheme. The record in 
Jones v. SEC
203 was thinner than that in St. Joseph Stock Yards, and 
Justice Sutherland was able to produce an opinion more quickly than 
 
 201. Cooper,  supra note 36, at 598. 
 202. SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1935, at 36. 
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Hughes. Announced on April 6, 1936—after the Supreme Court had 
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act in January
204 and heard 
arguments regarding the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in 
March
205—the decision in Jones avoided deciding whether Congress 
had the power to regulate the issuance of securities and found instead 
that the Commission’s procedures had violated Jones’s rights.
206 
Sutherland’s opinion contributed to the inflamed atmosphere 
surrounding the Court in 1936.
207 
Throughout 1935, lawsuits were buzzing around Jones’s head.
208 
The reason, he said, was that Harold Ickes, who as Secretary of the 
Interior supervised oil production, was out to get him because of 
Jones’s adamant opposition to what he called Ickes’s attempt to give 
“dictatorship powers to him[self] for the absolute control of the 
petroleum industry.”
209 Jones saw himself as the representative of the 
small, ruggedly individualistic, independent oil producers standing up 
against major oil companies’ efforts to mobilize the government to 
crush them under the guise of eliminating sharp business practices 
and overproduction.
210 Jones quoted an unnamed source who had told 
him that Ickes wanted the SEC “to ‘turn on the heat’ in my personal 
direction,” and that Ickes had said, “I will put J. Edward Jones in cold 
 
  204.  Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated by United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
  205.  Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991, invalidated by Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 206. Jones, 298 U.S. at 21–22. 
 207. See infra text accompanying notes 268–75. 
  208.  The oddest lawsuit was a criminal prosecution brought by the federal government 
against William Rabell, who had been employed as an accountant and investigator for the SEC. 
The government charged Rabell with soliciting a bribe from Jones. Jones Bribe Case Called Plot 
on SEC, N.Y.  TIMES, Oct. 1, 1935, at 3. Jones testified that Rabell came to his house in 
Scarsdale, New York, in June 1935 and offered to testify favorably to Jones at an SEC hearing 
in exchange for $27,500, of which, the government said, he received $250. Rabell Bribe Case 
Dismissed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1936, at 10. Jones was cooperating with the local U.S. 
Attorney’s office in an effort, Rabell’s lawyer argued, to “ruin” the SEC, and, again according 
to Rabell’s lawyer, Jones’s attorney “had acted as ‘stage manager’” for the prosecutors, who had 
planted recording devices at Jones’s house. Jones Bribe Case Called Plot on SEC, supra. The 
episode was bizarre enough that the first jury to hear the case could not arrive at a verdict. After 
testimony closed at a retrial, the judge dismissed the case against Rabell on the ground that the 
SEC had never had any intention of using him as a witness, so that whatever Jones gave him 
could not have been a bribe, although it might have been extortion. Rabell Bribe Case 
Dismissed by Judge, supra. 
 209. SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, supra note 202. 
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storage and keep him there till the next Ice Age.”
211 Jones, for his 
part, told an associate that he “wanted to ruin . . . [SEC] Chairman 
[Joseph] Kennedy.”
212 
As a result of a five-week investigation of Jones’s operations, the 
SEC in February 1935 obtained an injunction against Jones and his 
associates.
213 According to the SEC, the investigation had disclosed 
that Jones was paying what he called dividends on oil royalties that 
were in fact the proceeds of sales of other securities, and that “Jones’s 
profit in many instances approximated 700 per cent.”
214 “[A]s a 
tactical move,” Jones said, he consented to the temporary injunction 
even though he denied the SEC’s allegations.
215 He intended to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Securities Exchange Act when 
the SEC sought a permanent injunction.
216 
Before that happened, though, Jones filed a registration 
statement in May for a new offering of rights to participate in the 
distribution of oil royalties. This eventually became the vehicle for 
Jones’s attack on the SEC’s constitutionality. The SEC told Jones 
that it proposed to direct him to stop offering the rights, saying that 
his registration statement appeared to contain untrue statements and 
to omit other facts that investors would find important. Under the 
Securities Exchange Act, the registration would become effective on 
May 24. On May 23, the SEC sent Jones a telegram saying that it 
would hold a hearing on the statements on June 6, later postponed 
until June 18. On June 13, the SEC issued a subpoena directing that 
Jones appear with his business records. Jones refused to comply with 
the subpoena. Instead, on the new hearing date, he had his attorney 
seek to withdraw the registration statement. William Green, the 
hearing officer, refused the request, relying on an agency rule saying 
that the agency had discretion to refuse to allow registrants to 
withdraw their filings.
217 Otherwise, the SEC’s lawyer told Green, 
sellers like Jones could “go right up under the gun of a stop order” 
and then withdraw the offering.
218 
 
 211. SEC Seeks Writ Against J.E. Jones, supra note 202. 
 212. Jones Is Witness at Trial of Rabell, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1935, at 8. 
 213. J.E. Jones Enjoined in Oil Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1935, at 21. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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 217. Id. 
 218. Id. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
2011]  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s 1605 
When Jones evaded another subpoena, the SEC went to court 
for an order directing Jones to appear. Jones appealed the trial 
court’s decision granting that order, and the court of appeals affirmed 
the order. Judge Martin Manton’s opinion dismissed Jones’s 
constitutional arguments, finding that Congress could use its power to 
regulate the mails to make it unlawful to sell unregistered securities.
219 
Jones supplemented his regular lawyers for his appeal to the Supreme 
Court. He hired Bainbridge Colby, a New York lawyer who had been 
Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, and James M. Beck, an 
archconservative who had been Solicitor General in the Harding 
administration before winning a seat in the House of 
Representatives.
220 
Beck and Colby devoted most of their argument to attacking the 
SEC’s constitutionality,
221 leaving to the final pages of their brief the 
argument that the SEC had to allow Jones to withdraw his 
registration statement and so had no power to subpoena him after 
that.
222 On the SEC’s denial of the statement’s withdrawal, Jones’s 
lawyers told the Supreme Court that the SEC was on a “fishing 
expedition,” which Jones undoubtedly saw as a continuation of its 
Javert-like pursuit of an innocent man.
223 Beck made what turned out 
to be a crucial point about the refusal of withdrawal: publicity about a 
pending SEC action would inevitably make it difficult for even “the 
great house of J.P. Morgan” to issue stock, because SEC action, even 
at a preliminary stage, would suggest that the issuer could not be 
trusted.
224 The government’s brief, signed by Stanley Reed and written 
 
  219.  Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1935). 
  220.  Brief for Petitioner, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 640); William F. Swindler, 
Constitutional Retrospect: The First Series of Cutler Lectures Revisited, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 2 (1981) (“James M. Beck of Pennsylvania . . . . had been Solicitor General of the United 
States under President Harding and by 1935 would be a vigorous critic of the New Deal.”); G. 
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 77 (1999) (referring to “Bainbridge Colby, the last Secretary of State to serve in the 
Wilson administration”). 
  221.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 220, at 9–56. The heart of the constitutional argument 
was the seemingly peculiar point that the registration requirement did nothing to prevent fraud 
because a completely fake security could be offered through the mails as long as the registration 
statement made it clear that the security was indeed a fake. Id. at 9; Securities Act Held 
Violation of State Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1936, at 5. 
 222. Brief  for  Petitioner,  supra note 220, at 57–71.  
 223. Id. at 58; Securities Act Held Violation of State Rights, supra note 221. 
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with the assistance of the SEC’s chief counsel John Burns and 
Department of Justice attorneys Charles Horsky and Alger Hiss, was 
a bit more balanced, but it, too, focused on the constitutional 
question.
225 
The Supreme Court did not. After the oral argument, Landis 
wrote Frankfurter that “[t]he only possibility of defeat is on a 
procedural point,” which turned out to be accurate, and that he could 
not “see a sane bench of judges not giving us some freedom in 
working out our procedural technique,” which was not.
226 A six-
Justice majority held that Jones had an absolute right to withdraw his 
registration statement before it became effective.
227 Justice Sutherland 
noted that the statute had no provision dealing with withdrawal.
228 
Without guidance from the statute or indeed from any other statutes 
dealing with agency power, Sutherland turned to judicial practice. 
The settled rule, he said, was that plaintiffs had an “unqualified right” 
to dismiss a complaint unless doing so would harm the defendant.
229 
The SEC’s regulation, which said that the Commission “shall” give 
consent to a dismissal “with due regard to the public interest and the 
protection of investors,” was, to Sutherland, the same as the judicial 
rule.
230 And he found nothing in the record to indicate what prejudice 
could result from withdrawing a registration statement before the 
SEC had acted: “an abandonment of the application was of no 
concern to anyone except” Jones.
231 
Sutherland went on to offer an “additional reason” for giving 
registrants an absolute right to withdraw.
232 The SEC’s notice to Jones 
 
rule, which was first announced in a press release, had not been more formally placed in the 
official register of agency actions. See id. (“[Jones’s attorney] asserted that nowhere in the 
Securities Act[ of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006),] did Congress deny the right to 
withdraw a registration statement, and added that the basis of this compulsion came through a 
commission regulation, of which notice was given only in a release to the newspapers. Justices 
Butler and McReynolds . . . seemed impressed with the ‘lack of publication’ of this ruling.”); 
Securities Act Held Violation of State Rights, supra note 221 (“Later it was developed that now 
all of the commission’s rules are published in the Federal Register.”). 
 225. See Brief for the Respondent, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 640). 
  226.  Letter from James Landis to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 11, 1936) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library). 
 227. Jones, 298 U.S. at 21–22. 
 228. Id. at 19. 
 229. Id. at 21–22. 
 230. Id. at 22. 
 231. Id. at 23 (“The possibility of any other interest in the matter is so shadowy, indefinite, 
and equivocal that it must be put out of consideration as altogether unreal.”). 
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informed him that the agency had questions about the registration 
statement, and “invited” him to explain why the registration should 
not be suspended.
233 But, “[i]n the face of such an invitation, it is a 
strange conclusion that the registrant is powerless to elect to save 
himself the trouble and expense of a contest by withdrawing his 
application,” which “accomplishes everything which a stop order 
would accomplish.”
234 All this was largely unexceptionable. 
And then the rhetoric escalated dramatically. As Sutherland 
wrote, 
The action of the commission finds no support in right principle or 
in law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. . . . [T]o the precise 
extent that the mere will of an official or an official body is 
permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to 
supplant the standing law as a rule of human conduct, the 
government ceases to be one of laws and becomes an autocracy.
235 
“Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution,” he continued, 
“cannot both exist.”
236 Accepting the Progressive account of modern 
government, Sutherland described agencies as “necessarily called . . . 
into existence by the increasing complexities of our modern business 
and political affairs,” and said that they could not be “permitted 
gradually to extend their powers by encroachments—even petty 
encroachments—upon the fundamental rights, privileges, and 
immunities of the people.”
237 Otherwise, “we shall in the end, while 
avoiding the fatal consequences of a supreme autocracy, become 
submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of personal rights, less 
destructive but no less violative of constitutional guaranties.”
238 
The SEC tried to defend its refusal to allow the withdrawal by 
asserting that the submission of the registration statement triggered a 
general authority to investigate Jones’s business activities. Sutherland 
disagreed. The only point to the SEC’s inquiry was to examine the 
registration statement. Once Jones withdrew it, the SEC had not 
identified any other reason for an investigation. Sutherland cited 
earlier statements condemning “fishing expedition[s],” and quoted a 
well-known lower court opinion harshly describing such inquiries as 
 
 233. Id. 
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“intolerable tyranny”: they were “general, roving, offensive, 
inquisitional, [and] compulsory, . . . without any allegations, upon no 
fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law.”
239 To Sutherland, 
“An investigation not based upon specified grounds is .    .    . as 
objectionable as a search warrant not based upon specific statements 
of fact.”
240 Further, “[t]he fear that some malefactor may go 
unwhipped of justice weighs as nothing against this just and strong 
condemnation of a practice so odious.”
241 After all, Sutherland 
observed, there were other ways of investigating Jones’s practices—a 
criminal investigation and grand jury indictment.
242 
Sutherland’s position had some merit. He went too far, though, 
in linking the SEC’s inquiry to the “intolerable abuses of the Star 
Chamber,” and insisting that “[e]ven the shortest step in the direction 
of curtailing” the right against “unlawful inquisitorial 
investigations . . . . must be halted in limine lest it serve as a precedent 
for further advances in the same direction.”
243 Somehow Sutherland 
discerned in the government’s position the “philosophy that 
constitutional limitations and legal restraints upon official action may 
be brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance, may follow.”
244 
Exactly what all this had to do with the Jones case itself remained 
quite unclear. Perhaps in his own eyes Jones was pure as the driven 
snow, but the 1935 injunction against him suggested otherwise.
245 It 
was not obviously arbitrary for the SEC to exercise an informed 
discretion to inquire into the honesty of his most recent effort to sell 
securities. Frankfurter’s and Stone’s comments on the opinion seem 
apt. As Frankfurter wrote to Stone, “Sutherland writes as though he 
were still a United States Senator, making a partisan speech.” To this, 
Stone replied that Jones “was written for morons, and such will no 
doubt take comfort from it.”
246 In another letter to Frankfurter, Stone 
described the opinion as full of “platitudinous irrelevancies,” 
 
 239. Id. at 26 (quoting Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 445 (1915)); id. at 27 (quoting In re Pac. 
Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 263 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)). 
 240. Id. at 27. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 27–28. 
 243. Id. at 28. 
 244. Id. at 27. 
  245.  Jones’s strategic decision not to contest the injunction weakened any inferences that 
could be drawn from that episode. 
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“set[ting] at naught a plain command of Congress, without the 
invocation of any identifiable prohibition of the Constitution.”
247 
Justice Cardozo wrote a brief dissent, in which Brandeis and 
Stone joined. He acknowledged that Sutherland’s reminders “of the 
dangers that wait upon the abuse of power by officialdom unchained” 
were “so fraught with truth that [they] can never be untimely.”
248 But, 
he continued, “[T]imely too is the reminder, as a host of 
impoverished investors will be ready to attest, that there are dangers 
in untruths and half truths when certificates masquerading as 
securities pass current in the market.”
249 Evoking Brandeis’s favorite 
dictum that sunlight is the best disinfectant, Cardozo said that such 
wrongs “must be dragged to light and pilloried.”
250 Sutherland’s 
analogy to the Star Chamber and similar practices were, Cardozo 
wrote, “strange.”
251 The “denunciatory fervor” with which the analogy 
was made led to the understated observation that “[h]istorians may 
find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile.”
252 
Turning from the rhetoric in and philosophy animating 
Sutherland’s opinion, Cardozo constructed a straightforward legal 
argument against Jones. Cardozo found the SEC rule allowing 
withdrawal of registration statements only with the SEC’s consent to 
be valid.
253 With that as a predicate, the continuing inquiry into 
Jones’s practices was not “a roving examination.”
254 The rule made 
sense because “[r]ecklessness and deceit do not automatically excuse 
themselves by notice of repentance”:
255 even a withdrawn registration 
statement might support civil or criminal liability. Congress wanted to 
make sure that “retribution for the past is added to prevention for the 
future” by giving “overlap[ping]” authority to the SEC and the 
Department of Justice and by providing for immunity from criminal 
prosecution for statements made under compulsion to the SEC.
256 
 
  247.  Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 9, 1936) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Special Collections Library). 
 248. Jones, 298 U.S. at 32 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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Cardozo ended his opinion, “The Rule now assailed was wisely 
conceived and lawfully adopted to foil the plans of knaves intent 
upon obscuring or suppressing the knowledge of their knavery.”
257 
Jones was of a piece with St. Joseph Stock Yards. The majorities 
in both cases were to some degree skeptical about the fairness of 
proceedings before some administrative agencies. In both cases, the 
majority sought refuge in general and formalistic rules that would 
constrain imperfect agencies. In both, the majority accepted the fact 
that the rules would also interfere with the smooth operation of well-
functioning agencies. That was the import of Hughes’s reference to 
“subservient” agencies
258 and of Sutherland’s insistence that 
incursions on rights had to be stopped at their seemingly mild onset. 
The dissents in both cases were confident that courts could “[stick] 
close to the practicalities of government as revealed by history,”
259 and 
that they could accurately apply “pragmatic test[s] of workability in 
an imperfect world.”
260 Their confidence in the courts led them to 
place a lower value than the majority on the possibility (or, as the 
majorities would have said, the fact) that some agencies would 
sometimes go off the rails. 
SEC chair James Landis issued a statement saying that the Jones 
decision “would put some difficulties in the way of labeling fraudulent 
promoters as such,” but that the Commission’s work would go on 
because most of the agency’s investigations involved registrations that 
had taken effect.
261 A story in the Wall Street Journal observed that 
the decision left some uncertainty about the SEC’s power because it 
indicated that the agency could investigate after a registration became 
“effective” without defining what the effective date of a registration 
was.
262 It suggested that aggressive lawyers for securities issuers could 
take advantage of the Court’s condemnation of “fishing expeditions” 
to challenge investigations undertaken pursuant to statutory 
 
 257. Id. at 33. 
  258.  St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936). 
 259. Felix  Frankfurter,  Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE  L.J. 458, 477–78 
(1939). 
 260. Dean  G.  Acheson,  Mr. Justice Cardozo and Problems of Government, 37 MICH.  L. 
REV. 513, 524 (1939). That article and Frankfurter, supra note 259, are tributes to Cardozo 
occasioned by his death. 
 261. Landis to Keep Up Fight on Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1936, at 18. 
 262. Supreme Court Decree Creates Uncertainty over SEC Powers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
1936, at 5. TUSHNET IN FINAL.DOC 3/30/2011  11:58:59 AM 
2011]  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE 1930s 1611 
provisions mentioned but not involved in the Jones decision.
263 
Reflecting Wall Street’s general satisfaction with the disclosure 
regime administered by the SEC, editorialists at the same paper were 
as little disturbed as Landis.
264 The decision left “[n]o [c]asualties,” as 
their editorial was titled.
265 Nothing in the decision “seriously 
impair[ed] the usefulness” of the SEC, because the decision, “[a]t 
most, admonishe[d] SEC that it [did] not possess a specific power . . . . 
No part of the very great amount of excellent work the SEC ha[d] 
done was based upon” its power to continue an investigation after a 
registration statement had been withdrawn, the editorial argued.
266 It 
reassured its readers that “[p]ublic security offerings remain[ed] as 
fully subject to the Commission’s scrutiny as ever.”
267 
Newspaper commentators on the Court’s work saw in the 
decision “the characteristic cleavage of opinion between the members 
of the [C]ourt on problems arising out of the relation of government 
to the individual.”
268 Dean Dinwoodie, writing in the New York 
Times, focused on the “uncompromising tone” used by Sutherland 
and Cardozo.
269 Sutherland’s “warning” was “seemingly not 
demanded by the particular case at hand.”
270 Arthur Krock’s regular 
column on politics was more critical.
271 Sutherland and his colleagues 
“[were] determined to let no occasion pass, no word go unsaid, to 
check any possibility of invasion, by bureau or commission, of what 
they consider[ed] the constitutional reservations of Congress and the 
courts,” whereas Cardozo and his colleagues “obviously consider[ed] 
that the majority [was] overzealous and even imaginative in 
discovering these invasions.”
272 Sutherland “spared” no “space and 
diction . . . in the writing of resounding passages about the guarantees 
and reservations of the Constitution,” whereas Cardozo “suggested 
with none too faint irony that this majority prose booms louder than 
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is necessary.”
273 The lay reader, represented by Krock himself, saw the 
Justices “debating political philosophy, having in mind the general 
methods and tendencies of the New Deal. Mr. Jones and his struggle 
with the SEC were but incidents in the argument.”
274 For the 
Washington Post, Sutherland’s “castigat[ion]” of the SEC was 
particularly ironic because, “of all the New Deal eggs that were 
spawned, the SEC, with James M. Landis as its present head, ha[d] 
been acclaimed on all sides for its sensible caution in administering 
the law.”
275 
Having returned to Harvard Law School as dean after serving as 
chair of the SEC, Landis had a unique and personal perspective on 
the case. In his Storrs Lectures two years after the Jones decision 
Landis quoted Sutherland’s reference to the Star Chamber. 
Reflecting a bit of the outrage that Frankfurter had expressed, he said 
that this “outburst indicates that one is in a field where calm judicial 
temper has fled.”
276 The Court’s approach, Landis suggested, would 
have “the effect, if not the purpose,” of “breed[ing] distrust of the 
administrative.”
277 Still, Landis remained calm, perhaps to contrast his 
rhetoric with Sutherland’s. He suggested that the courts were 
defensive because they understood that agencies had proliferated 
because of the courts’ “inadequacies.” He further noted that the 
Supreme Court’s important cases were all divided, and that the 
dissenters were likely to prevail in the long run: “[b]ecause their 
reasoning seem[ed] more to accord with the temper of the times, it 
[was] they, rather than the majority, who [were] likely to gain 
adherents to their position.”
278 
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D. The  Morgan Cases 
The  Jones case attracted a fair amount of attention in the 
newspapers, perhaps because of Jones’s colorful personality.
279 The 
New Deal’s next confrontation with the Supreme Court over 
administrative law made the front pages because Henry Wallace 
believed that the Court had impugned his character in reversing a 
rate decision he personally had made. 
The episode, which ended up generating five Supreme Court 
opinions, began—as had the St. Joseph Stock Yards case—with an 
inquiry, following the market collapses of the 1920s, into the rates 
charged by commission men at Kansas City stockyards.
280 After two 
years of examination, the Hoover administration’s Secretary of 
Agriculture entered an order in May 1932 that reduced the rates by 
about 10 percent.
281 The commission men asked that the hearing be 
reopened “in view of changed economic conditions,” and new 
testimony was developed from July through November 1932.
282 The 
matter had reached the Secretary of Agriculture’s office when the 
new administration came in. Wallace believed that there were too 
many commission men and agencies, with “too much competition in 
the business.”
283 His basic theory was that sales agencies incurred 
fixed costs that did not vary with the amount of business, and that 
“too much competition” meant that rates had to cover too many of 
these fixed costs.
284 Wallace reduced the rates even further to reflect 
what he believed were more reasonable salaries for a more 
reasonable number of commission men.
285 
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The commission men appealed to a special three-judge court and 
then to the Supreme Court. They hired a heavy hitter to represent 
them: Frederick H. Wood of New York, a staunch opponent of the 
New Deal who had successfully argued A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States
286 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
287 the latter just 
six weeks before he appeared in the Supreme Court again to present 
the argument for the commission men.
288 
The commission men were most concerned about the rates, but 
they added a procedural challenge to their appeal. The Packers and 
Stockyards Act required that the Secretary of Agriculture give the 
middlemen a “full hearing,”
289 and the commission men alleged that 
they had not had a full hearing. They identified what they regarded as 
three key deficiencies in the procedures. First, they had asked the 
hearing examiner in the 1932 proceedings to “prepare a tentative 
report” to which they could respond with an oral argument in front of 
the Secretary of Agriculture. But no such report was prepared.
290 
Second, they objected to the fact that the evidence had been 
presented to R.W. Dunlap and Rexford Tugwell as Acting Secretaries 
of Agriculture, whereas the statute required that only the Secretary 
could set rates.
291 And, finally, industry gossip led them to allege that 
Wallace “had not personally heard or read any of the evidence 
presented,” nor had he read the briefs prepared by the middlemen or 
heard any oral arguments from them, but that he had instead relied 
entirely on “consultation with employees in the Department of 
Agriculture out of the presence” of the commission men’s lawyers.
292 
The lower court held that these allegations were irrelevant.
293 The 
implication of this holding was that even if everything the commission 
men said was true, they had still had the “full hearing” the statute 
required. 
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The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the lower 
court’s ruling on the “full hearing” question. Chief Justice Hughes’s 
opinion set aside some of the commission men’s objections.
294 Acting 
Secretaries heard the commission men’s objections to the proposed 
rates, but Tugwell had left the final decision to Wallace. Noting in 
passing that Wallace could have delegated the authority to set rates to 
his subordinates, although he had not done so here, Hughes endorsed 
administrative freedom to organize bureaucracies in ways that 
administrators found to be most effective.
295 
The heart of the problem, though, was that, according to the 
allegations, Wallace had set the rates “without having heard or read 
any of the evidence” or even any of the briefs prepared by the 
commission men’s lawyers, relying entirely on informal 
“consultations” with department employees.
296 If those allegations 
were true, Hughes wrote, the commission men would not have had 
the “full hearing” the statute required. Hughes distinguished between 
“ordinary administration” and ratemaking, although the precise 
distinction was obscure, seemingly having something to do with the 
special requirements Congress had placed on ratemaking 
proceedings.
297 When Congress had “requir[ed] the taking and 
weighing of evidence, [and] determinations of fact based upon the 
consideration of the evidence,” the proceedings were “quasi-judicial,” 
and brought into play “the tradition of judicial proceedings” in which 
“the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to consider 
the evidence.” Hughes continued that “[t]he ‘hearing’ [was] the 
hearing of evidence and argument. If the one who determine[d] the 
facts which underl[ay] the order ha[d] not considered evidence or 
argument, it [was] manifest that the hearing ha[d] not been given.”
298 
The government contended that the statute’s requirement was 
satisfied if “the Department of Agriculture,” considered as a single 
entity without looking inside it to see who actually did what, set the 
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rates, and that courts could set aside rates unsupported by evidence.
299 
The problem, Hughes saw, was that courts deferred to agency 
factfinding because they assumed “that the officer who makes the 
findings has addressed himself to the evidence.”
300 The government’s 
“Department as a whole” theory, Hughes wrote, would allow one 
official to hear and consider the evidence and make findings and 
another official to set those findings aside “for reasons of policy” 
without considering “either evidence or argument.”
301 Because 
decisionmakers could use “assistants” to “sift[] and analyze[]” the 
evidence, and because arguments could be oral or written, requiring 
the decisionmaker to hear and consider evidence would not burden 
the administrative state.
302 What mattered was substance, and 
substance required that “the officer who makes the determinations 
must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
303 
Hughes concluded tersely, “The one who decides must hear.” The 
case was remanded to the lower court to find out whether the 
allegations about Wallace’s decisionmaking process were true.
304 
Consistent with Hughes’s views about the modest effects of the 
ruling on the operation of a modern bureaucracy, Wallace and other 
New Dealers took the decision in stride. They believed that what they 
had done was entirely consistent with what Hughes has described as 
an adequate “full hearing.” They were outraged, though, when 
Hughes offered what major newspapers called a “rebuke” to Wallace 
when the case returned to the Court two years later.
305 
The problem began when the lawyers for the commission men 
investigated how Wallace had actually gone about making his 
decision. They submitted forty-six interrogatories to Wallace, who 
seemed to be exercised as much by the number as by the content of 
the questions.
306 Although Wallace found it difficult to retrieve 
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detailed memories of events that had taken place more than three 
years before, his answers, prepared in consultation with his lawyer, 
Solicitor General Robert Jackson, showed that Wallace had 
personally evaluated the evidence and made the decision.
307 The one 
who decided had indeed heard. 
The answers, though, also revealed the catch-as-catch-can 
process of decisionmaking in the early days of the New Deal—and, 
perhaps, within any complex bureaucracy. Staff members, lawyers, 
and supervisors wandered the halls, had occasional conversations, 
dropped into offices to discuss aspects of the record, and produced 
documents that worked their way into Wallace’s hands.
308 The staff 
lawyer in charge of the case for the Department of Agriculture 
compiled a set of proposed findings of fact and delivered them to 
Wallace, who said that he would read them at home.
309 Over the next 
two weeks, Wallace argued with Mohler about the level at which the 
rates should be set, with Mohler taking the commission men’s side. In 
the end Wallace concluded that there were too many agencies in 
Kansas City and that the number could be reduced if the rates they 
were allowed to charge were reduced.
310 The strongly anti–New Deal 
Chicago Daily Tribune, sympathetic to the commission men, gave a 
political spin to Wallace’s decision: “As there are only a few dozen 
commission men in Kansas City as against tens of thousands of 
farmers who send livestock there to be marketed, a lowering of the 
fees can make few political enemies and many friends.”
311 
Wallace and his lawyers believed they had done all that Chief 
Justice Hughes said they should have. The oral argument took an 
unexpected turn, though, when the Justices began to focus not on 
whether Wallace had read the evidence and made the decision but 
rather on how informal the deliberative process was; the Justices 
probed topics such as whether the commission men’s lawyers had 
seen proposed findings of fact (they had not) and whether they had 
been given an opportunity to comment on the material Wallace 
received (which, again, they had not).
312 These questions 
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foreshadowed the decision that Hughes announced six weeks after 
the argument. 
With the facts in hand, Hughes concluded that the commission 
men had not in fact had the “full hearing” the statute required.
313 
Invoking the standard Progressive account of the administrative 
state’s origins, Hughes emphasized that the “vast expansion of this 
field of administrative regulation in response to the pressure of social 
needs” had to be accompanied by “adherence to the basic 
principles.”
314 Those principles included clear legislative guidance to 
the agencies Congress created and the rule “that, in administrative 
proceedings of a quasi-judicial character, the liberty and property of 
the citizens shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair 
play,” which included “a fair and open hearing.”
315 Hughes recited the 
facts, contrasting the “voluminous testimony” with the “general and 
sketchy oral argument” held when presentation of evidence had 
concluded.
316 Offering a series of rhetorical negatives, Hughes wrote 
that “[n]o brief was at any time supplied by the Government.  .  .  . 
[T]he Government formulated no issues and furnished appellants no 
statement or summary of its contentions and no proposed findings.”
317 
After Wallace had formulated his findings of fact, “[n]o opportunity 
was afforded to appellants for the examining of the findings . . . until 
they were served with the order.”
318 Wallace “did not hear the oral 
argument,” and only “dipped into” the “bulky record” from time to 
time to get its drift.”
319 He read the briefs and the transcript of oral 
argument, and had “several conferences” with the department’s chief 
lawyer and with staff members in the Bureau of Animal Industry.”
320 
For Hughes, a full hearing “require[d] more than that.”
321 Such a 
hearing required that the parties have “a reasonable opportunity to 
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know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.”
322 The 
Department of Agriculture’s practice did not offer that reasonable 
opportunity. There was “no specific complaint” and no report by the 
hearing examiner that would help shape the later proceedings.
323 
When Congress required a “full hearing,” it had “judicial standards” 
in mind, “not in any technical sense but with respect to those 
fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due 
process.”
324 Fairness was absent, Hughes wrote, when “the plaintiff’s 
attorney . . . formulate[d] the findings . . . , [and the judge] conferred 
ex parte with the plaintiff’s attorney regarding them, and then 
adopted his proposals without affording an opportunity to his 
opponent to know their contents and present objections.”
325 In a 
simple case, perhaps the Secretary—the one who decides—could 
preside over a hearing and “make his findings on the spot,” or in a 
more complex one, “receive the proposed findings of both parties, 
each being notified of the proposals of the other.”
326 It was, though, “a 
vital defect” and not a mere “irregularity” that Wallace had adopted 
the findings prepared by “the active prosecutors for the Government, 
after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any 
reasonable opportunity to the respondents  .  .  . to know the claims 
thus presented.”
327 
Hughes finished with a flourish: maintaining “proper standards” 
in hearings “in no way cripple[d] or embarrasse[d] the exercise” of an 
agency’s power, but actually was “in [its] manifest interest.  .  .  . [I]f 
these multiplying agencies . . . [were] to serve the purposes for which 
they [had been] created and endowed with vast powers, they must 
accredit themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished 
judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play.”
328 Justice 
Black, newly appointed to the Court, dissented without opinion.
329 
Although Wallace’s initial reaction was temperate
330—a 
statement that the Court’s decision would not affect ratemaking 
because the department had already changed its practices—he soon 
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became upset.
331 Wallace believed that the Court was engaging in a 
bait and switch, saying in its initial decision that all it needed to know 
was whether Wallace himself had made the decision—which he had—
but saying later that the process in which Wallace had engaged had 
denied the commission men “the rudimentary requirements of fair 
play.”
332 With other New Dealers, he was quite uncertain about what 
the Supreme Court was demanding of administrative proceedings. In 
round one, the Court had said that it would merely be good practice 
to prepare proposed findings of fact and allow the commission men’s 
lawyers to read, comment on, and possibly object to them; in round 
two, it seemed that the Court might be requiring the preparation of 
such proposed findings.
333 
Perhaps more important, Hughes’s opinion seemed to cast doubt 
on the kind of informal consultations within the bureaucracy that 
were almost inevitable, treating them as occasions on which sinister 
influences might be exerted rather than as the way in which 
bureaucrats with different areas of expertise exchange information 
and work out solutions to the complex problems handed to them.
334 
And perhaps most important, Wallace saw Hughes’s opinion as 
an effort to revive the obstructionism he and his colleagues in the 
New Deal thought had been defeated in the prior year’s struggle with 
the Court. At a press conference three weeks after the Court’s 
decision, Wallace said, “One year ago a great battle was fought to 
decide whether the courts could take over the function of determining 
policy for the nation. That battle was suspended when the courts 
retreated from the legislative field. This year another battle seems to 
be opening.”
335 A week later, editorialist and constitutional historian 
Merlo J. Pusey echoed Wallace’s sense of what was at stake in an 
editorial column entitled “New Court Fight?”
336 Implicitly drawing 
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the same conclusion, the Wall Street Journal editorial page approved 
the Court’s “sharp—and apparently needed—warning to all 
administrative agencies.”
337 That the decision “should have been 
necessary,” the editorial continued, was “a sign of the times in which 
we live.”
338 The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that the decision showed 
“that the men and women who fought the court-packing proposal 
were right.”
339 
Wallace decided to strike back at the Court, conducting his 
campaign on two fronts—public opinion and law. He wrote a long 
letter to the New York Times describing how he and the Department 
of Agriculture had made their decision, and chastising the Court for 
using the case as “a convenient peg on which to hang a statement” 
that “flash[ed] a warning to quasi-judicial agencies” and threatened to 
perpetuate “the interminable delays for which some [corporate 
lawyers] are famous.” For Wallace, “The final court of appeal in the 
United States [was] the bar of public opinion,”
340 and Wallace argued 
before that bar through this letter and letters he wrote to every U.S. 
Senator.
341 
Wallace also pressed Solicitor General Jackson to file a petition 
for rehearing that would emphasize the bait-and-switch issue.
342 To no 
one’s surprise, except perhaps Wallace’s, the Court rejected the 
petition.
343 The assertion that the decision was “directly contrary” to 
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the earlier decision was “unwarranted” and “wholly unfounded.”
344 
The government was “in no position to claim surprise.”
345 The 
question raised by the first decision was whether the commission men 
had been given a “full hearing.”
346 The Court had mentioned the 
possibility of an interim report by the hearing examiner, but it had 
not required one—nor did the new opinion.
347 What mattered was 
fairness in the overall proceeding—and the cumulation of defects, 
each perhaps tolerable on its own, was the problem.
348 
This, the Court’s third opinion in the matter, eased the burdens 
that its second opinion might have placed on the administrative state. 
The simplest response would be to have hearing examiners prepare 
proposed findings of fact and to make them available to those subject 
to regulation. If that occurred, perhaps the informal discussions 
disparaged as “ex parte consultations” might be acceptable—a 
desirable result for complex cases in which hearing examiners might 
need assistance in developing the proposed findings. The 
administrative state would be pushed to adopt court-like procedures 
at an interim, though important, stage, but agencies would not have to 
transform themselves into courts. The adjustments required by 
Morgan v. United States (Morgan II),
349 as interpreted by the opinion 
on rehearing, would undoubtedly slow administrative action. But 
those adjustments would not bring the administrative state to a halt 
or even cause a dramatic decline in its ability to deal with social and 
economic change. The general intrusion of judicial modes of action 
had already hobbled the administrative state. No one could call a 
ratemaking proceeding that had begun in 1930 and remained open in 
1938 expeditious. Morgan II made the situation worse, but only a bit 
worse.
350 
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E.  Looking Backward and Forward from 1940 
The New Deal’s defenders of the modern administrative state 
knew they had lost all the important cases the Supreme Court had 
decided. Landis leveled acerbic criticisms at the Court; others offered 
almost equally severe criticisms in more temperate tones.
351 Yet, for 
all the criticisms, the New Dealers seemed not to have appreciated 
how much ground they had gained. The Court’s major administrative 
law decisions were contemporaneous with the decisions that 
provoked the crisis of 1936 and 1937, and the Court’s divisions here 
mirrored the divisions there—generally along lines conventionally 
described as conservative versus liberal. Perhaps the New Dealers 
were misled by this fact and distracted by some rhetorical flourishes 
in the Court’s opinions. The New Dealers knew that administrative 
agencies were not, as Justice Sutherland had suggested in Jones, the 
modern version of the Star Chamber. If the Court so seriously 
misunderstood how agencies actually operated, New Dealers may 
have thought, it could not possibly be sympathetic to the 
administrative state at all. Further, the concept of expertise near the 
heart of the Progressive vision for administrative law referred to 
objective scientific facts. Any departure from deference to expert 
judgment was a departure from objective reality, or so the 
Progressive theorists may have thought. From that perspective, small 
movements away from the status quo toward administrative 
autonomy were no better than complete stasis or even regression to a 
Diceyan world. 
The New Dealers themselves may have misunderstood how far 
the Court had gone to accommodate their theory of administrative 
law. They had argued that the modern administrative state required 
courts to withdraw almost entirely from supervising administrative 
agencies. Agency findings of fact, for example, should be completely 
binding on the courts. That aspiration was probably unrealistic in a 
world in which Diceyan ideas still had some purchase.
352 Progressive 
theorists had an unrealistic sense of what experts could accomplish, as 
their treatment of the idea of a fair rate of return—and their 
seemingly willful failure to think seriously about the partisanship of 
the NLRB—showed. The Hughes Court may have understood that 
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the limitations of expertise justified the kind of loose supervision of 
the administrative state that it developed. And even the Progressive 
theorists of administrative law in the 1930s recognized the continuing 
influence of mere—and mean—politics in administrative agencies. 
Preserving some role for the courts in supervising agencies could 
inhibit any further degeneration of the idealized administrative state 
they hoped to embed in the nation’s constitutional scheme. 
Still, failing to obtain 100 percent of what they sought was not in 
itself a defeat. Each of the “losses” in the Supreme Court allowed 
incursions on even a rather weak version of Diceyanism. St. Joseph 
Stockyards and Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB
353 required the 
courts to defer substantially although not completely to agency 
findings of fact; the Morgan cases allowed hearing examiners to adopt 
rather loose procedures, looser than would have been tolerated from 
the ordinary courts to which Diceyans looked. Defenders of the 
administrative state might have lost every contentious case, but along 
the way they won a substantial amount—not everything, but a great 
deal. At the end of the 1930s the administrative state emerged largely 
unscathed—and perhaps even strengthened—by the Supreme Court. 
By the end of the 1930s Frankfurter was in a position to write an 
opinion for the Court restating and endorsing the standard 
Progressive account of the rise of the administrative state and the 
Progressive vision of administrative procedure. In FCC v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting Co.,
354 the Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia criticizing the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) for failing to adhere to the 
instructions that court had given it. As Frankfurter saw it, the lower 
court had misunderstood its role when it applied a rule about what 
lower courts should do in response to a remand from a higher court. 
That rule made sense in its precise setting but was inappropriate 
when a court reviewed an agency’s decision. “The technical rules 
derived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals . . . are taken 
out of their environment when mechanically applied” to review of 
agency decisions.
355 “Modern administrative tribunals . . . ha[d] been a 
response to the felt need of governmental supervision of economic 
enterprise—a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither 
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directly, through self-executing legislation, nor by the judicial 
process.”
356 Agencies had “power far exceeding and different from the 
conventional judicial modes for adjusting conflicting claims.”
357 Their 
functions in modern government “preclude[d] wholesale 
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have 
evolved from the history and experience of courts.”
358 Congressional, 
not judicial, supervision was the remedy for abuses: “Congress  .  .  . 
must be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal. 
Interference by the courts is not conducive to the development of 
habits of responsibility in administrative agencies.”
359 
Just months after Hughes’s retirement, Justice Reed’s opinion 
for the Court in Gray v. Powell
360 embodied the Supreme Court’s view 
of administrative agencies and sounded all the themes Progressives 
had articulated.
361 The case involved the Bituminous Coal Division of 
the Department of the Interior, which regulated coal production by 
setting prices. The statute governing the Division provided an 
exemption for coal “produced” by the entity that used it.
362 The 
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company (Seaboard) leased several 
mines from their owners, paying a rent measured by the amount of 
coal Seaboard took from the mines. Seaboard then hired an 
independent contractor to operate the mines and deliver the coal to 
it. The mine operator received a flat rate per ton of coal from 
Seaboard, thus, as Justice Reed’s opinion observed, bearing “all the 
risks of operation.”
363 The Bituminous Coal Division found that 
Seaboard was not a “producer” exempt from regulation.
364 When the 
case reached the Supreme Court, a majority accepted the Division’s 
conclusion.
365 
Three dissenters argued that the case involved a straightforward 
question of statutory interpretation: what did Congress mean when it 
said that “producers” of coal for their own use were exempt from 
regulation? Justice Reed saw the issue differently. For him, “[T]he 
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function of review placed upon the courts . . . [was] fully performed 
when they determine[d] that there ha[d] been a fair hearing, with 
notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and 
arguments to the decisive body, and an application of the statute in a 
just and reasoned manner.”
366 That “usual administrative routine” 
resulted from Congress’s decision to “delegate” the decision to 
exempt some producers from regulation “to those whose experience 
in a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more 
equitable, adjustment of the conflicting interests.”
367 Contractual 
arrangements and ownership were the poles of a continuum between 
which were “innumerable variations,” and “[t]o determine upon 
which side of the median line the particular instance falls calls for the 
expert, experienced judgment of those familiar with the industry.”
368 
Committing this kind of decision to “specialized personnel” was “a 
familiar practice.”
369 Justice Reed concluded, “It is not the province of 
a court to absorb the administrative functions to such an extent that 
the executive or legislative agencies become mere factfinding bodies 
deprived of the advantages of prompt and definite action.”
370 As law 
professor Ray Brown wrote, “[I]n this decision . . . , the old law and 
fact criterion . . . has given way to the pragmatic test—which body, 
court or administrative agency, has the better expert qualification for 
deciding the issue presented.”
371 The Progressive theorists of 
administrative law could not have put it better. 
Pottsville and Gray show that the Supreme Court had come to 
accept nearly the full Progressive vision of administrative law. But 
that vision was undergoing some transformation. Progressive theorists 
of administrative law had added an important supplement to their 
earlier emphasis on expertise alone. The procedures used by 
administrative agencies would, as Gellhorn put it, democratize the 
agencies by making them—rather than, or at least in addition to, 
Congress—the forums for pluralist bargaining among affected 
interest groups. Agencies would serve as the representatives of the 
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public rather than, or at least in addition to, serving as the vehicles of 
disinterested professional expertise.
372 
The Supreme Court began to accept the pluralist defense of 
agencies in an important decision dealing with who could challenge 
administrative action. In the early years of administrative law, courts 
allowed regulated entities—those whose legal rights were affected—
to obtain judicial review of agency action.
373 The notion of “affecting 
legal rights” necessarily required some baseline to identify the legal 
rights, and courts found that baseline in the common law.
374 In the 
ordinary case this posed no difficulties. But as agencies began to 
dispense valuable benefits, things changed. Recipients of licenses 
were happy to receive them; their competitors were unhappy. 
Traditional common law doctrine held, though, that no one had a 
legal right to be free from competition.
375 Consider an agency that 
awarded a license based on a mistaken view of the law, to the 
disadvantage of a competitor. With the common law as a baseline, the 
competitor could not challenge the agency’s action, and lawlessness 
would go unchecked.
376 
In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
377 decided in 1940, the 
Supreme Court addressed this problem and expanded the class 
entitled to challenge agency action as unlawful. The FCC awarded a 
new license to operate a radio station in Dubuque, Iowa.
378 A 
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competing radio station across the Mississippi River intervened in the 
FCC proceeding, contending that the area could not generate enough 
advertising revenue to support two stations.
379 The FCC disagreed, 
and the competitor went to court.
380 
A unanimous Supreme Court held, first, that the competitor was 
entitled to seek judicial review of the agency’s decision even though it 
had suffered no injury to a right protected by the common law. The 
Court then held that the statute did not require the FCC to take 
competitive injury into account when awarding licenses.
381 The statute 
gave a right to seek review to “any . . . person aggrieved or whose 
interests are adversely affected” by agency action.
382 A radio station 
already operating in an area was “adversely affected” when a new 
station started to operate, even though it was not protected from 
competition by the common law.
383 Congress, the Court held, could 
give competitors a right to obtain judicial review because “[i]t may 
have been of [the] opinion that one likely to be financially injured by 
the issue of a license would be the only person having a sufficient 
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law” 
in the agency’s action.
384 
Sanders Bros. exposes several aspects of administrative law near 
the end of Hughes’s tenure. By expanding the class of entities entitled 
to seek judicial review of agency action, the Supreme Court gave the 
courts a continuing role in supervising the administrative state. 
Although competitors might not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of statutes that put them at a competitive 
disadvantage,
385 they could challenge agency decisions doing so. 
Sanders Brothers’s intervention in the FCC proceeding confirmed 
that the agency was a venue for the kind of give and take among 
interest groups that had become characteristic in modern legislatures. 
Indeed, one might see the standing decisions near the end of the 
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Hughes Court as suggesting that the location of pluralist give and 
take had shifted from the legislature to the agencies. 
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OUTSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 
Progressive administrative law theory seemed to have triumphed 
in the Supreme Court. But the story in the organized legal profession 
and in Congress was a less happy one for Progressives. This Part 
concludes the examination of administrative law in the 1930s by 
describing the political reaction to the developments in the Supreme 
Court, a reaction so hostile to the Progressive vision that Progressive 
scholars perhaps should have reevaluated their criticisms of the 
Court’s decisions. If their opponents thought that drastic changes 
were needed in administrative law, the Progressives might have said 
to themselves, perhaps the Court had given them a great deal of what 
they wanted. 
Administrative law in the 1920s and early 1930s embodied a 
compromise among Progressive advocates of administrative 
autonomy, courts concerned about preserving traditional safeguards 
of individual rights (and their own power), lawyers who sought to 
preserve their role in the new administrative order by insisting that it 
have some degree of legalization, and corporate interests who saw in 
administrative law an acceptable tradeoff between the costs of 
adjudication and expeditious disposition of cases. That compromise 
came under pressure in the 1930s. The administrative state expanded 
dramatically, creating constituencies supporting the new 
bureaucracies and, not incidentally, supporting the Roosevelt 
administration. The Supreme Court increasingly accepted the 
Progressive vision of administrative law, and a new cadre of lawyers 
moved into the nation’s administrative bureaucracies, forming a 
counterweight to the segments of the bar representing corporate 
interests. The traditional elite bar sought to reestablish the older 
equilibrium by supplanting administrative law as developed by the 
Supreme Court with a more comprehensive statutory framework. 
Dismayed by what he took to be the influence of political 
patronage on awarding radio licenses, which he had observed after he 
served as the first general counsel to the FCC, Louis G. Caldwell 
persuaded the American Bar Association’s (ABA) president to 
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role lawyers and courts could play in controlling agencies.
386 Caldwell 
became the new committee’s chair just as the New Deal invigorated 
administrative government.
387 The committee’s initial forays were 
quite modest, turning the Progressive theory of the administrative 
state guided by science and expert knowledge to its own purposes by 
proposing that Congress create a specialized and expert 
administrative court with, however, a quite limited jurisdiction.
388 This 
proposal was the hobbyhorse of Kentucky “colonel” Ollie Roscoe 
McGuire, a self-promoting critic of the New Deal who had 
collaborated with James M. Beck on a book whose title—Our 
Wonderland of Bureaucracy—suggests its argument.
389 McGuire 
occasionally framed his quite modest proposal with references to 
“[d]ictators [who] may walk across the stages of foreign lands,” but 
his rhetoric outran his proposal.
390 McGuire also got the ear of 
Senator Mills Logan of Kentucky,
391 who had served as that state’s 
chief justice for a few months before his election to the Senate.
392 
Logan regularly introduced bills brought to him by McGuire dealing 
with administrative law, seeing them as compatible with Logan’s 
general support for the New Deal.
393 
McGuire took over as chair of the special committee in 1937, and 
began a campaign for more substantial revisions in administrative 
law.
394 The committee proposed that all administrative agencies adopt 
highly judicialized internal mechanisms of review, with deferential 
judicial review to follow.
395 The ABA endorsed these proposals in 
principle in 1937, although only after Washington lawyers had 
restructured them to exempt the most established agencies from their 
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requirements.
396 Dismayed at the direction the committee had taken, 
Arthur Vanderbilt, the ABA’s president-elect in 1936, replaced 
McGuire as committee chair with Roscoe Pound,
397 who had recently 
stepped down as dean of Harvard Law School.
398 Pound had a 
reputation as a Progressive-era defender of administrative 
governance, which he understood as embodying the compromise 
between technical expertise and lawyers’ influence on agency 
procedures.
399 
The special committee’s report had a schizophrenic character. Its 
“general report,” Pound’s distinctive contribution, offered a pointed 
attack on “administrative absolutism” bolstered by references to 
practices around the world.
400 Punctuated by important insights into 
the real world of administrative action, the general report’s 
intellectual force was undermined by its use of the term 
“administrative absolutism” to describe the strongest versions of the 
Progressive theory of administrative law. This failed to acknowledge 
that, whatever their aspirations, the Progressive theorists had come to 
an accommodation with the Diceyan tradition. That accommodation, 
indeed, might have been seen in the committee’s recommended 
statute, which was hardly commensurate with this critique, and even 
the committee’s discussion of the statute was significantly qualified. 
The committee rejected the “reactionary position” of eliminating 
large amounts of administrative decisionmaking, but “insist[ed]” that 
“safeguarding individual interests and preserving the checks and 
balances inherent in the common law doctrine of the supremacy of 
law” was consistent with the “large and . . . increasing rôle” of such 
decisionmaking.
401 Because “[a]dministration, with its ideal and 
function of getting things done,” had “a tendency to act from one 
side,” it needed to be balanced from the other.
402 Drawing upon 
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Progressive ideas about modern society, the committee continued, 
“The more complex a society, the more and more numerous and 
complex the relations and groups and associations of which it is made 
up, the more complicated becomes the task of adjusting their 
conflicting and overlapping interests and clashing activities.”
403 This 
could not be achieved within the administrative structure, contrary to 
the position taken by administrative absolutism, which maintained 
the “ideal” of “a highly centralized administration set upon complete 
control of the executive for the time being, relieved of judicial review 
and making its own rules.”
404 Composed of practicing lawyers and an 
academic no longer attuned to developments in the American theory 
of administrative law, the committee did not glimpse, as Gellhorn 
would, the outlines of a reconfiguration of administrative law in its 
third phase as providing a location within the administrative state for 
pluralist bargaining. 
The committee then mounted a challenge to the heart of the 
Progressive vision of administrative agencies. Quoting Landis on the 
“scientific” character of administrative inquiries, the committee used 
the example of the NLRB to question the idea that administrative 
hearings were calm and uncontentious. It also used that same 
example and that of deportation hearings to question the idea that 
administrative decisionmaking was “inherently scientific.”
405 These 
observations supported the committee’s regular description of 
agencies as under executive rather than professional or expert 
control: “[t]he postulate of a scientific body of experts pursuing 
objective scientific inquiries [was] as far as possible from what the 
facts [were] or [were] likely to be in a polity where the administrative 
bodies [were] . . . both by tradition and by legislation . . . subjected to 
centralized executive control.”
406 For the committee, “In many fields 
of administration there [was] no particular expertness,” whether at 
the level of the line officials charged with direct administration or at 
the level of the agency heads appointed for political reasons.
407 “The 
professed ideal of an independent commission of experts above 
politics and reaching scientific results by scientific means, ha[d] no 
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correspondence with reality.”
408 The committee described how 
agencies were created to serve narrow political goals: “this very 
subjection to politics . . . [was] often not the least reason for setting up 
administrative agencies in the minds of those who wish[ed] to see 
some particular subject put under the control of some particular 
group or interest.”
409 
Against the false claims of administrative expertise, the 
committee set the professional standards of the legal profession and 
the judiciary. These standards offset “tendencies” in agency 
decisionmaking, such as decisions without a full hearing or decisions 
made on the basis of evidence not formally presented. The committee 
agreed that “agencies should not be held to purely judicial 
procedure,” particularly rules of evidence that had developed to 
regulate proceedings in which lay jurors were the decisionmakers.
410 
That, though, made full judicial review even more important. Citing 
Sharfman’s praise of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
“safeguard[ing] all essential rights and interests,” the committee said 
that there was “evidence” that this had occurred “largely because the 
courts have compelled the Commission to do so.”
411 
The report then shifted gears, defending the rise of the 
administrative state and criticizing “extreme” court decisions in the 
late nineteenth century that resulted in “[s]omething very like a 
paralysis of administration by judicial order or judicial review.”
412 This 
“bad adjustment” resulted from “too much check upon 
administration,” followed by a “reaction” that provided no 
regularized accommodation of administration “as part of the legal 
order” and a failure of “systematic” allocation of authority between 
agencies and courts.
413 Rather than administrative absolutism, the 
solution lay in better court supervision of agencies. What was needed, 
the committee said, was “unification and simplification” of judicial 
review.
414 A single statute dealing with judicial review of agency action 
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should replace the confusing set of traditional remedies that had 
“grown up haphazard[ly].”
415 
In 1938, Senator Logan introduced an even more modest version 
of his originally modest proposal for an administrative court, but 
members of the ABA special committee testified against it. The 
Roosevelt administration temporized. In early 1939, Attorney 
General Frank Murphy appointed a Committee on Administrative 
Procedure to assess the situation and, if appropriate, to propose new 
legislation. Gellhorn directed the committee’s research, which 
included interviews with agency heads and staff members. The staff 
regarded the ABA committee, and Pound in particular, as offering 
“reform” proposals that derived not from serious inquiry into the 
failings of the existing system but from political predisposition and 
prejudice.
416 
The Attorney General’s committee faced a new threat, as the 
New Dealers saw things. Senator Logan had found an ally in the 
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House of Representatives—Francis Walter of Pennsylvania. The 
Walter-Logan bill, introduced in April 1939, rapidly gained ground in 
Congress. Unsurprisingly, testimony from twelve existing agencies 
opposed the bill. One testified that the bill’s procedural proposals 
would “very seriously hamper the efficient operation” of the 
agencies.
417 The administration’s efforts failed, and Logan reported 
the bill to the Senate, saying that the bill would “stem and, if 
possible, . . . reverse the drift into parliamentarism which, if it should 
succeed  .  .  .  , could but result in totalitarianism  .  .  . with the entire 
subordination of both the legislative and judicial branches of the 
Federal Government to the executive branch.”
418 Representative 
Walter had his House committee approve the bill in late 1939. The 
committee report described some “bureaucrats” who were 
“contemptuous of both the Congress and the courts; disregardful of 
the rights of the governed; and for lack of sufficient legal control over 
them, a few develop Messiah complexes.”
419 New Dealer 
Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York filed a dissenting 
report, saying that it was wrong to adopt a general administrative law 
measure to deal with the isolated misdeeds of one or two agencies. 
Celler specifically mentioned the NLRB and the Labor Department’s 
Wage and Hour Division.
420 
The debates over the bill’s adoption made clear that the bill was 
a challenge to the New Deal. As the bill evolved, its coverage was 
restricted. Older agencies such as the ICC were exempted, leaving 
only the newer, New Deal agencies affected. As one opponent put it, 
the bill with its exemptions  
[left] out those agencies that were built up back yonder to serve 
special interests . . . but when it [came] to those agencies that ha[d] 
been set up within the last ten years, . . . that gave the citizen some 
rights he should have enjoyed for the last 50 years, this bill would 
paralyze those agencies.”
421 
Proponents referred to the need to prevent Roosevelt from becoming 
a dictator, and to the Soviet Union as the kind of nation that lacked 
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protections like those in the Walter-Logan bill.
422 They criticized New 
Deal agencies for the very speed and efficiency that Progressive 
theorists of administrative law saw as among agencies’ best 
characteristics.
423 New Dealers in Congress tried to defeat the bill 
partly on the ground that it was a veiled attack on the New Deal, and 
partly because, they said, the Attorney General’s committee was 
likely to produce a better proposal. The crucial vote in the House was 
on a motion to send the bill back to committee. The motion failed by 
a vote of 272 to 106, after which the House adopted the bill on April 
18, 1940, by a vote of 282 to 96, with support from Republicans and 
some Southern Democrats. Senator Logan had died in October 1939, 
and the bill’s passage in the Senate in November by a two-vote 
margin was something of a tribute to him.
424 
As he had promised, Roosevelt vetoed the Act when it came to 
his desk. He criticized both “lawyers [who] still prefer to distinguish 
precedent and to juggle leading cases rather than to get down to the 
merits,” and “powerful interests which are opposed to reforms that 
can only be made effective through the use of the administrative 
tribunal.”
425 He said that he “could not conscientiously approve any 
bill which would turn the clock backwards and place the entire 
functioning of the Government at the mercy of never-ending 
lawsuits,” and he expressed his hope that the Attorney General’s 
committee would generate recommendations he could support.
426 The 
House failed to override the veto. 
The Attorney General’s committee submitted its report a month 
later, in January 1941. Three of the committee’s twelve members 
offered a statute that would require courts to reverse agency decisions 
that were “clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” 
rather than allowing them to affirm decisions using a nearly toothless 
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“substantial evidence” test. They also suggested that Congress should 
adopt a general statute dealing with administrative procedure, to be 
followed if necessary by modifications to deal with the peculiar 
requirements of specific agencies. The committee’s majority 
recommended a modest bill that would have restructured internal 
agency operations in some important ways but that said nothing 
about judicial review of agency decisions.
427 
CONCLUSION 
The Progressive vision for administrative law had the courts 
withdrawing almost completely from the supervision of 
administrative agencies. As the Supreme Court gradually accepted 
most of that vision, it chose to give up its ability to control the 
direction of administrative law’s development. The parts of that 
forbearance that resulted from the constitutional transformation of 
1937 were permanent. The parts that were “pure” administrative 
law—interpretations of the statutes establishing the agencies—were 
not. Congress could reverse the Hughes Court’s abandonment of 
judicial control over administrative law. Eventually it did. As of 1941, 
though, that outcome could only barely be seen. 
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